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Large systems engineering projects have an astonishingly high failure rate. The reasons

hypothesized for such a high failure rate include the neglect of nonsalient system elements
such as social and human or organizational aspects of systems. Social and human factors have
long been known to be critical elements of systems that are frequently ignored (e.g., Goguen,
1994). Systems engineering processes can benefit and be improved by effective utilization of a
framework that helps developers expand their attention and efforts beyond the salient aspects
of the system and the development process. In the aviation field, the Human Factors Analysis
and Classification System (HFACS) is used to facilitate the consideration of non-salient, easily
overlooked influences on the potential for aviation mishaps. This system has improved the
effectiveness of the aviation accident investigation by helping investigators perform a thorough
analysis of the system factors that may have contributed to the accident. HFACS helps aviation
organizations improve their quality assessment and monitoring by making explicit the
relationships between a wide range of organizational factors and accident risks. In this
research, a framework similar to HFACS was developed for the systems engineering domain.
viii

The purpose of the framework is to guide and improve systems engineering projects. This
research was conducted using qualitative methods to identify the elements and structure of a
framework for quality improvement in system engineering. Data extracted from interviews and
systems engineering literature was assessed in a bottom-up manner to identify emergent
patterns and in a top-down manner using HFACS-based themes. The framework developed
from this research can be used to guide systems development organizations analyze both the
obvious and the latent reasons behind a project’s failure. This would help systems development
teams to better understand the causal factors underlying a systems development failure and
look out for them in the future. Using the framework, organizations and development teams
can better understand the positive effects of considering all elements of a system, including the
social

and

human

factors

that

ix

may

not

be

obvious.

Introduction
Late in his career, accomplished computer scientist and mathematician Joseph Goguen
sought to bring attention to the importance of addressing the relationship between social and
technical factors in systems engineering. Goguen (1994) noted that “large projects have an
embarrassingly high failure rate” (p. 165), and suggested the neglect of social factors has
something to do with it. The Standish Group’s “CHAOS Report” provides information on
software project failures and the factors that lead to failure. The project failure rates reported
during 1994-2009 can be seen in Table 1.
Table 1
The Standish Group’s “CHAOS Report” Showing Information Technology (IT) Project Failures and
Successes from 1994-2009.
Year

Failed Projects

Challenged Projects

Successful Projects

1994

31%

53%

16%

1996

40%

33%

27%

1998

28%

46%

26%

2000

23%

49%

28%

2004

18%

53%

29%

2006

19%

46%

35%

2009

24%

44%

32%

Note. Adapted from “The rise and fall of the chaos report figures” by J.L. Eveleens and C. Verhoef, 2010. IEEE
Software. Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, 6, 30-36, p. 31.
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In the above table, successful projects are projects completed on time and within
budget showing all the features that were intended; challenged projects are projects that were
completed with an overshooting of both budget and time estimates and also showing fewer
features than intended; and failed projects are projects that were cancelled before completion.
The statistics are especially alarming in light of the costs of large systems and software
engineering projects. For example, the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) spent $4 billion on a
system that, as described by an IRS official, does “not work in the real world,” (Marketplace,
1997).
Other examples of systems development failure include:


Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI’s) Virtual Case File (VCF) project which was
supposed to automate the FBI’s paper-based work environment, allow agents and
intelligence analysts to share vital investigative information, and replace the obsolete
Automated Case Support (ACS) system. The bureau had to scrap the US $580 million
project. Factors that may have contributed to the VCF's failure include: poorly defined
and slowly evolving design requirements; overly ambitious schedules; and the lack of a
plan to guide hardware purchases, network deployments, and software development
for the bureau (Goldstein, 2005).



A computer-aided dispatching system was developed for the London Ambulance Service
(LAS) to replace the manual system. The LAS received calls; dispatched ambulances
based on an understanding of the nature of the calls and the availability of resources;
and monitored progress of the response to the call. This new system was designed to
2

include an automatic vehicle locating system (AVLS) and mobile data terminals (MDTs)
to support automatic communication with ambulances. Immediately after becoming
operational, the call traffic increased heavily and the system could not keep track of the
location and status of units and incorrect databases were formed. Instances of the
ambulance crew arriving at their location to find the patient dead and the ambulance
answering a “stroke call” as much as 11 hours after the call illustrated the ineffective
functioning of the system. Eight days after the deployment, the system was seized
completely (Finkelstein & Dowell, 1996).


NIMROD was a large, UK government –funded, early warning defense system project.
Huge amounts of money were poured in and many hundreds of people were hired
(Bush, 1997). What looked like a magnificent project in the making, was not really so.
This project involved the development of both novel hardware and software. There
were problems with both areas, and also with the compatibility of the two. After ten
years of work and 100 million pounds spent, the funding was cut and a version of the
U.S. Airborne Weapons and Control System (AWACS) was adopted. Reasons behind the
project’s failure could be the often increasing requirements, ineffective change
management, unrealistic schedules and inefficient communication among development
staff (Bush, 1997).



The Theater Battle Management Core System (TBMCS) is an air command and control
(C2) system that performed standardized, secure automated air battle planning and
execution management for Air Force, multi-service, and allied commanders in the
theaters of operation worldwide. According to Collens and Krause (2005), some of the
3

problems faced which may have contributed to the failure of the initial system
development effort (a follow-on effort was considered successful) included:


The initial high level system architecture design affected the design and
development of the system.



The requirements management and allocation process for producing the first
release of TBMCS was inefficient.



The system and subsystem design was severely hampered by the complexity of
interfacing with legacy applications. Application vendors were not funded and
did not give away the code.



Miscalculation of the maturity and complexity of commercial and third party
software products.



Lack of understanding of how the system would be used and employed by the
different groups of users.



Difficulty in the integration of such a complex system.



Testing on TBMCS was conducted in contexts that lacked real-world complexity
and demands.



Another complex system development effort that did not fare well was the
mechanization of mines in England in the 1950s (Trist & Bamforth, 1951). Innovation
and automation were given top priorities and social aspects were neglected. The
introduction of this new method was followed by unchanged productivity and severely
4

deteriorated relations among miners and within the mining community. Factors that
could have attributed to the failure of the system included the neglect of social and
psychological phenomena (Trist & Bamforth, 1951).
In each of the above systems development examples, a variety of factors were at play,
interacting in complex ways. Note that in each case, the developers neglected or experienced
difficulty with factors relating to users (user requirements, interface with technology, demands,
work practices and work culture). To shed more light on the types of factors that can influence
the outcome of systems development efforts, the last of the systems development examples
will be described in great detail.
The Longwall Mining Case Study
An example of the neglect of relationships between key system elements in systems
engineering can be seen in the sociotechnical analysis and case study of the mechanization of
mining in England (Trist & Bamforth, 1951). In this example, the effects of new technologies on
workers’ interdependencies and relationships were not considered prior to the introduction of
the technologies.
The traditional mining method in England had, until mechanization in the mid-1900s,
been the “hand got” method. According to Trist and Bamforth, “Most competent authorities
appear to be agreed that the ‘hand-got’ methods that preceded the longwall provided the faceworker with a social balance that has since been lost” (p. 4). Hand-got work groups had
“responsible autonomy”; they worked in self-paced, self-selected interdependent working pairs
to which one or two other people might be attached. Even though the miners had simple
5

equipment, they had multiple tasks to perform which required multiplicity of skills. They took
pride in doing their duties and relied on themselves alone for achieving work goals. Workmates
developed close relationships and strong loyalties that extended to one another’s families.
The social organization of hand-got teams reflected decades, if not centuries, of
adaptation to work demands. The organization was especially well adapted to the stressful and
high-risk conditions of the underground mining environment. Teammates looked after one
another and could adapt their work pace and strategies flexibly to challenging conditions that
emerged (e.g., conditions such as loss of control over the roof, reduced working heights at the
typically 3-ft high coal face, and faults affecting the continuity of the coal seam).
With the introduction of coal-cutters and mechanical conveyers, mining operations in
England were changed so that the mining work was done by large teams working across a
broad face and multiple coal seams. Thus, mechanization replaced the small self-reliant teams
with large groups, usually composed of forty to fifty men, performing large scale activities sideby-side by without any interdependency. They worked in “functional isolation” (p. 30) from the
other men on the same shift. The coal-getting task was performed in three sequential shifts:
the cutting, ripping and filling-off shifts. The ease and productivity of work during the two later
shifts depended on the work of the shifts preceding them. As an example, the cutting shift was
required to cut the coal to specific dimensions. If the cutters failed to meet those dimensions,
the jobs of workers in the next stage became more difficult. The filling-off shift, where the coal
was moved on to the conveyer and where the largest number of men was employed, was
where troubles encountered across all shifts would accumulate. Although the work of the
6

earlier shifts was closely related to the work of later shifts, Trist and Bamforth note that the
tasks were done in strict isolation and the workers never even met.
The sequential nature of the shifts did not accommodate common challenges of mining;
rather, it assumed that each job could be performed with equal proficiency by each miner,
regardless of age or health, and on each day, regardless of mine conditions. Neither time nor
adequate pay was allotted for handling challenges. Arrangements were not made to assist
those with lower stamina. This increased stress on workers and increased tension among
workers and between shifts. Tension between shifts developed because later shifts were not
privy to the challenges that resulted in reduced work output or quality by a preceding shift and
which increased work demands for them. Inter-team conflicts were common with the handgot
mining team, but they improved intra-team solidarity. In contrast, both inter- and intra-shift
conflicts began to arise within the longwall mining team and miners found themselves on their
own in a system that reinforced individualism.
Mechanization did not require a miner use his varied skill set; nor did it respect the
‘underground expertise’ of the older miner. Every group did the same specific task every day;
this task and the worker’s productivity became the basis for worker status within the new
system. The payment method, for example, pay per hole, pay per yard, and day wage, also had
an effect on the worker’s job satisfaction. Apart from the specific task a miner was assigned,
special tasks called “bye-work” would be required at times. Bye work was work that had to be
done to make possible the smooth execution of mining tasks across shifts—e.g., fixing a roof.
Miners did not feel they were compensated fairly for bye work, nor for their usual work when
7

faced with challenging conditions—which was not uncommon. This had a tremendous effect on
the worker’s attitude towards work. Moreover workers in unfavorable natural conditions (e.g.,
low ceilings or poorly prepared faces) tended to be less likely to put forth good effort, out of
annoyance over the conditions and because the low-quality work could be blamed on the bad
conditions.
Trist and Bamforth assert that the social changes brought about by mechanization were
largely to blame for subsequent low productivity, low morale, and a high turnover rate. Even
“widespread incidence of psycho-somatic and kindred neurotic disorders” (p. 30) among miners
was seen, which highlights the “human” costs of neglecting psychological and sociological
factors under mechanization.
Goguen on How to Address the Social Aspects of Systems
Thus far some examples of system development failures have been discussed. This and
the following sections will describe more about the goals of systems engineering, in particular
the systems thinking concept.
Goguen implicates as a root cause of the very high system development failure rate the
neglect of key system elements during engineering projects. In particular, Goguen points to the
social elements of the system—the technology users and the users’ organization—as routinely
neglected and poorly addressed by systems developers. Additional evidence of this tendency to
neglect human and social aspects can be found in the effort to add a human view to the
Department of Defense Architectural Framework (DoDAF; Baker, Stewart, Pogue, & Ramotar,
2008; Bruseberg, 2008; Handley & Smillie, 2008). Goguen used ethnomethodology as a tool to
8

study the importance of social aspects of a system. Ethnomethodology is a method for
understanding the ways in which culture shapes and imbues the work practices, goals, and
priorities of people in an organization by analyzing their accounts of their day-to-day
experiences, their work artifacts and their communications. It is a descriptive method and does
not engage in the explanation or evaluation of the particular culture undertaken as a topic of
study. Goguen (1997) stated, “Ethnomethodology tries to reconcile radical empiricism with the
situatedness of social data, by looking closely at how competent members of a group actually
organize their interactions” (p. 10).
Goguen used ethnomethodology to explain the principle of accountability and the
principle of orderliness. According to the principle of accountability, the members in a group are
held accountable for their actions depending upon where their group is placed in the society or,
in our context, in the organization. Thus, the behavior and interaction of members of a work
group are constrained by the nature of accountability imposed by the group. According to the
principle of orderliness, social interaction and behavior are orderly and can be understood with
respect to contextual and cultural constraints. Thus, a group’s interaction can only be fully
understood in the context of that particular group, which is the essence of ‘qualities of
situatedness’. Thus to understand a system, the work group should be analyzed. The failure to
take into account this human side of the system leads to system designs that are poorly
matched to an organization’s work culture and practices. Trist and Bamforth make this point.
All analysis of the mining system problems were analytical (dry); neglecting the social aspects of
the system. Thus, ethnomethodological approaches play a vital role in the development and
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achievement of systems thinking, an important systems engineering perspective that will be
explained in the next section.
Systems Engineering Quality Improvement
According to the International Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE, 2006), a system
is “a construct or collection of different elements that together produce results not obtainable
by the elements alone. The elements, or parts, can include people, hardware, software,
facilities, policies, and documents; that is, all things required to produce systems-level results"
(“Definition of a System”, para. 1).

Note that people are included in this definition as a core system element. Thus although
people and related social factors tend to be neglected by systems developers, the systems
engineering profession identifies them as key factors to be addressed. Furthermore, the
systems engineering profession emphasizes the importance of systems thinking - the
consideration of a system in a holistic way, in terms of all its components and their
relationships. Again, the inclusion of people and social issues in the systems engineering
problem space would seem to be a goal of the profession and, by extension, of any group
endeavoring to develop or adapt a system.

To help developers engineer systems in ways consistent with the goal of systems
thinking and the definition of a system, a framework is proposed. This framework will help
developers monitor whether they are engineering the system in a balanced way, that is,
whether they are addressing all systems elements and their relationships and whether they are
using processes, methods, and tools that support a balanced and holistic approach. In doing so
10

the framework should help developers handle the social aspects of systems as well as they
handle the technical aspects. Goguen’s concerns might be reduced and, likewise, the number of
unsuccessful system development efforts and unusable or user-hostile systems might be
reduced.

Systems thinking helps developers consider the mutual dependence of all system
components. It promotes team effort by integrating all the disciplines and forms a well defined
development process. Systems thinking also helps systems developers understand both the
emergent characteristics of the system and various development and acquisition risks, which
thereby helps them achieve the final goal efficiently. Thus systems thinking strives to provide a
quality product in which all elements, including users, interact well with and support one
another.
Approaches for Achieving Quality in Systems Engineering
According to Goguen (1997), “The very rapid rate of change of requirements, which is so
typical of large projects, implies an even more rapid rate of change for specifications. This
makes many formal methods very difficult, perhaps even impossible, to apply in practice” (p.
115).
Goguen (1997) stresses the point that systems engineering must be highly flexible,
supportive of emergent requirements and open, in the sense that it has to adapt to the changes
in the customer needs.
An evolutionary systems engineering approach, an approach that addresses both the
social and the technical aspects of systems, is thought by Goguen to be the key to systems that
11

integrate users with technology, and which are more likely to produce systems development
successes. An evolutionary approach, in which a system is gradually developed in its context of
use, is more consistent with the realities of requirements and system life cycles than currently
popular approaches.
The requirements for a large system are tough to determine; the requirements only
become clear when the system is successfully operating in its social and organizational context;
requirements evolve as system development proceeds, and a reasonably complete and
consistent set of requirements for a large, complex system emerge as it is used. Determining
whether some system meets its true requirements is the outcome of a complex social process
that typically involves negotiation, and may involve legal action. Thus it is usually entirely
misleading to think of requirements as pre-given.
According to Goguen (1997), “lifecycle phases cannot be fully formalized. Indeed, the
activities that are necessary for a successful system development project cannot always be
expected to fit in a natural way into any system of pre-given categories.” (p. 7) and “the
requirements phase of a large system development project is the most error-prone, and these
errors are the most expensive to correct” (Boehm, 1986 Davis, 1990 as cited by Goguen).
Goguen’s claim about the neglect of social factors in system development efforts, is
echoed in the work of Robert Hoffman, a human factors methodologist who notes that popular
software and system engineering approaches (e.g., waterfall, spiral, and agile development
frameworks) are noticeably lacking in guidance for integrating technology designs with their
users and use environments (e.g., Hoffman & Elm, 2006). Two of the most popular and
12

influential systems engineering tools, the waterfall development model and the spiral
development model are discussed below, followed by a discussion of a popular approach to
systems development quality assurance called the Capability Maturity Model Integration
(CMMI). Each is presented as an example of a popular and accepted approach to quality
assurance in systems engineering that neglects human and social factors of systems.
The waterfall model. In the waterfall model, the process proceeds from one phase to
the next in a purely sequential manner. For example, when the requirements specification is
fully completed, one proceeds to design. This design should be a plan for implementing the
requirements given. When the design is fully completed, an implementation of that design is
made by coders. Towards the later stages of this implementation phase, separate software
components produced are combined to introduce new functionality and reduced risk through
the removal of errors. The waterfall model can be seen in Figure 1.

Figure 1. The waterfall model. Adapted from “Managing the Development of Large Software
Systems” by Royce (1970). Proceedings of IEEE WESCON 26, 1–9, p. 329
13

The waterfall model is defective in large and complex systems development projects
where the requirements constantly keep changing and where stepwise completion of the
processes is not a reality because later stages affect the work of earlier stages. While using the
waterfall model, if clients change their requirements after the design work ends, the design will
not be modified to accommodate the new requirements.
The Spiral development model. The spiral development model, as seen in Figure 2, is a
software development process introduced by Boehm (1986) combining the benefits of
prototyping (an iterative process of building a model of a system) and the waterfall model in an
effort to combine advantages of top-down and bottom-up development approaches (A topdown approach is essentially the breaking down of a system to gain insight into its
compositional sub-systems. Here an overview of the system is first formulated and then each
subsystem refined in greater detail until the entire specification is reduced to base elements. A
bottom-up approach to development is done in a data-driven, context-specific manner and not
based on generic pre-determined structure).
The spiral model is intended for large, expensive and complicated projects. In every
iteration, project risks are effectively identified and handled. A preliminary design is created for
the new system. A first prototype of the new system is constructed from the preliminary
design. This prototype is evaluated in terms of its strengths, weaknesses, and development
risks. Now the requirements of the second prototype are defined. Planning and designing the
second prototype now begins followed by constructing and testing the second prototype.
Therefore the spiral development model is a model where timelines are taken care of and the
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product can be delivered as scheduled. This model is not usually understood well and
development teams end up following the waterfall model, even though they claim that they
used the spiral development model. That is, they develop a system one module at a time via
the waterfall stages and consider the sequence of module development to be spiraling. In
contrast, Boehm envisioned that the entire system would be iteratively refined in a holistic way
(Boehm, 1986).

15

Figure 2. The spiral development model. Adapted from "A Spiral Model of Software
Development and Enhancement” by Boehm, 1986. ACM SIGSOFT Software Engineering Notes,
11(4):14-24, p. 16.
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Capability Maturity Model Integration® (CMMI). Capability Maturity Model Integration
(CMMI) is a process improvement approach that provides organizations with the essential
elements of effective processes that ultimately improve their performance. CMMI was
developed by a group of experts from industry, government, and the Software Engineering
Institute (SEI) at Carnegie Mellon University. CMMI can be used to guide process improvement
across a project, a division, or an entire organization. It helps to integrate traditionally separate
organizational functions, set process improvement goals and priorities, provide guidance for
quality processes, and provide a point of reference for appraising current processes.
In a CMMI appraisal, an organization is appraised and given a maturity or a capability
level of 1-5 as seen in Figure 3. There are three classes of appraisals, namely A, B and C,
focusing on identifying improvement opportunities and comparing the organization’s practices
to the CMMI best practices. The appraising norms should conform to the Appraisal
Requirements for CMMI (ARC) document. The ARC document defines the requirements
considered essential to appraisal methods intended for use with CMMI models. Appraisal
methods used in the ARC document may be applied for different purposes, including
assessments for internal process improvement and capability evaluations for supplier selection
and process monitoring.

17

Figure 3. CMMI maturity levels. Adapted from “What is CMMI?” by Godfrey, 2008. NASA
presentation.

Additionally, The Standard CMMI Appraisal Method for Process Improvement (SCAMPI)
is designed to provide benchmark quality ratings relative to CMMI models. It is applicable to a
wide range of appraisal usage modes, including both internal process improvement and
external capability determinations. SCAMPI also satisfies all the ARC requirements. The CMMI
model framework can be seen in Table 2.
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Table 2
CMMI Framework
Abbreviation

Name

Area

Maturity Level

REQM

Requirements Management

Engineering

2

PMC

Project Monitoring and Control

Project Management

2

PP

Project Planning

Project Management

2

CM

Configuration Management

Support

2

MA

Measurement and Analysis

Support

2

PPQA

Process and Product Quality assurance

Support

2

OPD

Organizational Process Definition

Process Management

3

CAR

Causal Analysis

Support

5

CMMI focuses on three areas of interest:


CMMI for Development (CMMI-DEV), addressing product and service development.



CMMI for Acquisition (CMMI-ACQ), addressing supply chain management, acquisition
and outsourcing processes.
19



CMMI for Services (CMMI-SVC), addressing delivery services within and out of the
organization.

The intended benefits from using CMMI include:


The organization's activities are explicitly linked to its business objectives.



Customers can be informed about various practices performed in the organization and
their adherence to CMMI processes.



Increased visibility into the organization's activities which helps to ensure that the
product or services provided meets the customer's expectations.



CMMI appraisal increases performances in the areas of cost, customer satisfaction,
quality, productivity, and schedule.
Thus CMMI appraisals are based on whether the business and engineering processes

specified by an organization are actually followed by that organization.
The systems engineering practices discussed above (waterfall model, spiral
development model and CMMI) are formal models that reinforce a focus on managerial and
technical aspects of a system such as technology development, schedule, and budget. These
models do not help developers address or consider social and human aspects and they attempt
to simplify and constrain complex problems and the simplification process runs counter to
addressing social and human aspects. For example, Goguen explains requirements as being
social, open and emergent, but the CMMI and waterfall models do not permit emergence of
requirements or adaptation to changes, two critical processes that help handling complex
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problems (Norman, 2004). Limitations such as these were highlighted in a study by Hoffman,
Neville, and Fowlkes (2009) and will be discussed in the next section.
Limitations of traditional approaches to quality assurance
Current engineering practices neglect relationships and dynamics among system
elements in favor of a focus on individual system components. To study the importance such
relationships between system elements, a cognitive task analysis (CTA) was conducted to study
the work domain of IT systems development (Hoffman, Neville, & Fowlkes, 2009).
Documentation analysis conducted as a part of the CTA involved examining over 50 documents
on topics related to development and acquisition of IT. Interviews were conducted in which six
experienced systems and software engineers were asked about systems development
challenges they had faced. Systems development challenges that emerged included difficulties
in identifying user needs, coordination within development team, coping with complexity,
budget and schedule, and most importantly, difficulty in accommodating changing information
and requirements across the development effort.
The CTA highlighted the insidious effects of changing nature of requirements. The
authors stated, “Traditional systems development paradigms require early requirements
definition, and all software-writing activities flow from that. Subsequent changes in
requirements often present “back to square one” situations, are therefore ignored or taken as
evidence of poor requirements gathering.” The development teams must understand the
emergent, open, contingent nature of requirements and the associated constraints. The
authors suggest, “Requirements assessment should be an ongoing process across the
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development effort, so that it detects ways in which practitioners adapt then work methods
and new prototypes.”
Systems Thinking Frameworks in Other Domains
The idea behind this research is to develop a framework that helps the system and
software development teams to focus on both salient and less salient elements of a system
including the technology components, humans in the system, system environment setting, the
organizational and cultural values and practices, and the interfaces between components. The
development of the system using a holistic approach is intended so that better quality systems
can be engineered.
The next section presents existing formal models that reinforce systems thinking and
which therefore have had an influence in the development of a “systems thinking” framework
for systems development. In the aviation domain, analysis of breakdowns in an organization
can be particularly well understood by the “Swiss cheese” model proposed by Reason (Reason,
1990), as seen in Figure 4. Reason’s model has served as the foundation for the Human Factors
Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) framework, which is used in the aviation domain and
also in the medical domain (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). After describing HFACS, a recent
effort by Paletz, Bearman, Orasanu, and Holbrook (2009) to extend HFACS will be discussed.
The third “systems thinking” framework to be discussed is Leveson’s (2009) Hierarchical
Accident Model, which was used to evaluate the causal factors in a mission interruption of the
Solar Heliospheric Observatory (SOHO) (Leveson, Lundqvist, Stringfellow, & Weiss, 2009).
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Reason’s “Swiss Cheese” Model of human error causation. James Reason (1990)
describes four levels of factors that can contribute to a system breakdown in the aviation
industry (too often referred to as “human error”, a misnomer used by Reason as well) in the
“Swiss Cheese” Model.

Figure 4. The “Swiss Cheese” Model of human error causation. Adapted from “Human Error,”
by Reason, 1990. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Reason presents four levels of an organization that contributes to an error, namely;
Organizational influences, Unsafe supervision, Preconditions for unsafe acts, and Unsafe acts.
According to Reason, factors at all levels of an organization contribute to an error, even though
the error was committed at one particular level. Thus, aircrew, maintainers, supervisors and
management are involved in the causal factors leading to the accident/incident in aviation. The
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first organizational level of Reason’s model, describes Unsafe Acts that refer to the aircrew
errors that lead to an accident. They are referred to as active failures because most causal
factors are uncovered in this level. The latent failures refer to the actions and conditions that
set stage for and make the accident possible. Categories of latent failures include
organizational influences, unsafe supervision, and preconditions for unsafe acts.
Organizational influences describes factors such as political factors or fiscal factors that
play a major role in shaping the organizational climate. Reason suggests that the organizational
policies play a role in the causal sequence leading to a failure. Unsafe supervision, describes the
inefficient supervision or inappropriate practices of the supervisors which might lead to a
failure. Preconditions for unsafe acts involve work conditions that foster mental fatigue and
inefficient communication and coordination among the crew members and also between all the
members of the organization.
Reason’s model guides the accident investigation processes by addressing all the levels in
the organization in a causal sequence to failure and making the accident analyst look for causal
factors in both the active and the latent levels of the organization.

Human Factors Analysis and Classification System. “Human beings by their very nature
make mistakes; therefore, it is unreasonable to expect error-free human performance”
(Wiegmann & Shappell, 1997).
Based on Reason’s (1990) “Swiss Cheese” model of system failures, the Human Factors
Analysis and Classification System (HFACS), as seen in Figure 5, was developed. HFACS is useful
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in accident investigation because it helps analysts consider the latent failures within a causal
web of influences. The HFACS framework breaks down each level of the “Swiss Cheese” model
into various categories thereby providing a wide range of causal factors to be considered and
addressed for effective and efficient aviation accident investigation.
HFACS categorizes “Organizational Influences” into errors based on Resource
Management, Organizational Climate, and Organizational Processes. Similarly “Unsafe
Supervision” is classified into four categories: Inadequate Supervision, Planned Inappropriate
Operations, Failure to Correct Problem, and Supervisory Violations. “Preconditions for Unsafe
Acts” includes Environmental Factors, Conditions of Operators, and Personnel Factors.
Environmental Factors again include Physical Environment and Technological Environment.
Conditions of Operators includes Adverse Mental States, Adverse Physiological States, and
Physical/Mental Limitations. Personnel Factors includes Crew Resource Management and
Personal Readiness. “Unsafe Acts” is classified into two categories: Errors and Violations. Errors
are again categorized into Skill-based Errors, Decision Errors, and Perceptual Errors. Violations
on the other hand are categorized into Routine Violations and Exceptional Violations
(Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003).
A comprehensive description of all the 19 causal categories described in HFACS can be
seen in Appendix A. The HFACS framework provides the accident analysis investigators with a
tool for comprehensively identifying and classifying the human causes of aviation accidents.
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Figure 5. The HFACS framework. Adapted from “A human error approach to aviation accident
analysis: The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System” by Wiegmann, and Shappell,
2003, p. 71. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company.
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An application of HFACS can be seen in helicopter emergency medical service (HEMS),
which plays a vital role in the U.S. health care industry. Since 1998, there has been a troubling
increase in the number of accidents and fatalities associated with this group because of human
related errors (Boquet et al., 2009). Like other aviation operations, skill-based errors comprised
the majority of the unsafe acts, followed by decision errors, violations and perceptual errors.
Accidents that involved violations were three times more likely to be associated with a fatality
(Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). Thus HFACS was used to shed light on the human error involved
in HEMS accidents, allowing for a greater description than is typically associated with standard
reporting.
While the HFACS improves system failure classification is should be clear from the
earlier arguments that social factors are neglected. Paletz, Bearman, Orasanu, and Holbrook
(2009) introduced additional categories to the HFACS structure. Paletz et al. state, “Social
psychological phenomena have long been known to influence attitudes and behavior but not
been highlighted in accident investigation models.”The authors attempted to make the HFACS
taxonomy more complete by identifying and including social factors that contribute to system
breakdown. Social pressures contribute to poor decision making by leading the pilots to
underestimate potential dangers (Paletz et al., 2009).
Paletz et al. studied the consequence of social pressures on the pilots flying in Alaska,
who often fly missions in adverse weather conditions and work within minimal infrastructure,
and often provide others with basic necessities. They used the critical incident interviewing
technique (Flanagan, 1954; Klein, Calderwood, & MacGregor, 1989) to interview 28 pilots who
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were asked to describe a challenging decision situation involving weather when they were pilot
in command. The interviews were audio-recorded and later transcribed. The initial coding was
conducted in an iterative data driven, bottom-up fashion and resulted in the identification of 31
pressures which were then coded into five categories (the first four categories were social
psychological influences) namely: informational social influence, the foot-in-the-door persuasion
technique, normalization of deviance, the internal self-motives of impression management and
self-consistency, and other (included pressures which were not strictly social or psychological).
The four social psychological influences are explained in Table 3. These categories (involving
social psychological influences) were then grouped into themes based on HFACS, as seen in
Figure 6 and Figure 7.
Table 3
Social Psychological Influences Assessed by Paletz et al.
Social Psychological
Influence

Description

Informational Social Influence

Informational social science is a type of
conformity, where a person look to others for
cues concerning correct behavior when he/she
is unsure of the correct way to behave.

Foot-in-the-door Persuasion
Technique

Foot-in-the-door technique (FITD) is a
compliance tactic that involves getting a person
to agree to a large request by first setting them
up by having them agree to a modest request.

Normalization of Deviance
(Progressive commitment)

Normalization of Deviance is a phenomenon
based on insidious small, progressive changes.
It is an incremental acceptance of a
progressively lower threshold, e.g., of safety, by
a group of people.
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Self-Motives: Impression
Management and Self-Consistency

People are motivated to act in ways that will
earn them respect and social acceptance. On
the other hand if their actions are conflicting
with their beliefs, the person often tends to
adjust their beliefs.

Figure 6. Inclusion of self-motives and progressive commitment in the HFACS framework.
Adapted from “Socializing the human factors analysis and classification system: Incorporating
social psychological phenomena into a human factors error classification system,” by Paletz,
Bearman, Orasanu, and Holbrook, 2009. Human Factors, 51, 435-445, p. 441.
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Figure 7. Inclusion of self-motives and progressive commitment in the HFACS framework.
Adapted from “Socializing the human factors analysis and classification system: Incorporating
social psychological phenomena into a human factors error classification system,” by Paletz,
Bearman, Orasanu, and Holbrook, 2009. Human Factors, 51, 435-445, p. 442.

The Paletz et al. study enunciates the importance of social psychological phenomena in
real flight operations and can be extended to pilots flying outside of Alaska. The author’s report
that these factors are generally over-looked in accident investigations and that existing accident
reports do not serve as a good source to study the role of social and psychological phenomena
in accidents. The Paletz et al. study was therefore important in that they attempted to include
rare pressures in HFACS to highlight the possible role of these social psychological factors in
accidents.

The Hierarchical Accident Model. Another accident analysis model designed to help
analysts consider a comprehensive range of factors is the Hierarchical Accident Model,
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developed by Nancy Leveson (2009). The Hierarchical accident model was used to evaluate the
contributing factors in a mission interruption of the Solar Heliospheric Observatory (SOHO)
(Leveson, Lundqvist, Stringfellow, & Weiss, 2009), which was a joint effort between the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the European Space Agency (ESA).
The SOHO launch took place on December 2, 1995, and the vehicle performed helioseismology
and monitored the solar atmosphere, corona and winds. According to Leveson et al. (2009), a
simple chain of events model is inadequate for analyzing accidents in complex systems. Leveson
et al. advocated the addition of a hierarchical abstraction that expands the types of
contributing factors considered. Three levels of hierarchical abstraction were used in the SOHO
accident analysis. Level 1 describes the mechanism of the accident, that is, the chain of events.
Level 2 includes the conditions that allowed the events in the first level to occur. Level 3
includes the factors referred to as the root causes or systemic errors. Systemic errors include:


Flaws in the safety culture, which include overconfidence and complacency, not
understanding software risks, inadequate emphasis on risk management, and incorrect
prioritization of changes.



Ineffective organizational changes, which include diffusion of responsibility and authority,
absence of a system safety program, limited communication channels, and poor
information flow.



Ineffective technical activities, which includes flawed or inadequate review process,
inadequate specifications, inadequate software or systems engineering, inadequate system
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safety engineering, simulation environments not matching operational environments, and
inadequate cognitive engineering and feedback.
The hierarchical accident model was also used to identify systemic factors in Ariane 5 and
Titan IVB-32 accidents. Similarities in the systemic factors in the three of the above mentioned
accidents, including the SOHO mission interruption, can be used to develop prevention
strategies for avoiding future accidents.
Premise Underlying this Research. The above discussions shed light on different kinds
of frameworks used in accident investigation and illustrate their job of bringing to light a
number of contributing factors and conditions leading to an accident. These factors can then be
used in an organization to understand their influence better, discourage the negative and
encourage the positive factors, and look out for them in the future to avoid accidents. By
focusing attention to a comprehensive set of latent and conspicuous factors, including preconditions to an accident or an undesirable situation, the influence of preconceptions,
tendency to premature closure (i.e. making decisions early), and other biases may be reduced.
The framework helps the organization to improve the quality of their work and product.
Thus, the premise underlying this research is that software and systems development
project teams will benefit from a similar type of framework that helps them attend to all key
elements of the system being developed and associated engineering activities. The framework
may also help an organization develop and nurture the various engineering activities to develop
quality teams, efficient teamwork, and hence improve quality in their work. In particular, a
comprehensive systems development framework could help organizations attend not just to
technical, budget, and schedule factors but also to human and social factors as a part of the
32

development work and engineering activities. In other words, the present work is a first step
towards a tool that should foster systems thinking in systems development.
Approach
In a recent issue of the journal Systems Engineering, authors Valerdi and Davidz (2009)
lament the lack of empirical research in the field of systems engineering. They suggest that four
challenges have, in particular, discouraged researchers from tackling systems engineering
topics: the immaturity of the field of systems engineering, a lack of appreciation for empirical
social science research that is qualitative in nature, a lack of access to data from systems
engineering teams, which operate in real-world settings over extended periods of time, and a
lack of accepted measures of quality in systems engineering.
This empirical research was conducted to develop a framework for systems
development. An ethnographic approach was used for data collection and analysis. The
approach was ethnographic in that data obtained using naturalistic methods were assessed to
learn about systems engineering culture, challenges, and factors that influence engineering
activities.
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Method
Overview
In this systems engineering research project, transcripts of semi-structured interviews
with engineers were analyzed for the purpose of developing a framework that can improve
quality in systems engineering the way HFACS framework has been used to improve safety in
aviation. The framework developed in this research effort is expected to serve as a foundation
that can be revised and built upon in future efforts.
Methods advocated by Valerdi and Davidz (2009) for studying systems engineering
include semi-structured and unstructured interviews, qualitative research methods that are
popular because of the rich and relatively unbiased (i.e., less influenced by the researcher) data
they typically produce. Data used in the present study were collected using a semi-structured
interview method referred to as Critical Decision Method (CDM, Flanagan, 1954; Klein,
Calderwood, & MacGregor, 1989). The CDM is a procedure for gathering practitioner
knowledge used to detect, respond to, and navigate difficult events. This technique was used
by Paletz et al. in their study, which was discussed earlier.
In a CDM, the interviewee recalls and describes a specific memorable past event in
detail. By relying on the recall of specific memorable past events, the researcher can collect
data grounded in actual experience rather than introspective, generalized reports. Data
collected using the CDM were broken down into data elements/chunks, which were coded.
Patterns in the data were noted with respect to the situation and a hypothesis, or grounded
theory, was formulated. This is consistent with Grounded Theory Research. Grounded Theory
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Research is a qualitative research approach where data are collected and evaluated before
hypotheses are derived (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). Each hypothesis, or theory, derived from the
data was validated using investigator triangulation (Johnson, 1997), a strategy used to promote
qualitative research validity where multiple researchers interpret the collected data. Another
strategy used to bolster validity is maintaining a link between findings and data in its raw form
to the extent possible. Maintaining this link allows readers to judge researcher interpretations
of the data.
Semi-structured interview data were analyzed for this project. The semi-structured
interview data analyzed for this project were collected by Hoffman, Neville, and Fowlkes (2009).
Hoffman et al. analyzed these data to identify challenges faced by systems development teams;
in the present work, the data were re-analyzed to identify systems development goals,
activities, challenges, characteristics, and factors that affect quality of the systems thinking in
systems development organizations.
Participants
Hoffman et al. conducted semi-structured interviews with six systems development
practitioners. Four were trained as software engineers and two were trained as systems
engineers. Five had 20 years or more of experience and one had 15 years of experience.
Knowledge elicitation approach. Each engineer was asked to recall a challenging and
memorable engineering project and talk through it. Three of the engineers were asked to
describe day-to-day activities. The three other engineers answered a set of open-ended
questions, as seen in Appendix B, about team structure, goals, activities, and processes. The
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projects chosen by the engineers are described in Table 4. Interviews were approximately 2 hrs
in duration. Interview data were audio recorded; audio recordings were subsequently
transcribed.
Table 4
Characteristics of the System Development Projects Described by the Participants
Employer
Major
Corporation

Project team
Medium-large; three
to four teams of
three to five people;
multiple
organizations.

Role in team
Systems engineer
as overall technical
lead

Project Goal
Over 18 months, develop a
demonstration of an upgraded
legacy training system

Major
Corporation

Small-medium; two
team leads; two to
five people per team

Software engineer
as team lead

Over 2 months within a 2-year
project, develop a control
system that ties the "blocks"
together and interfaces with
20 legacy messaging protocols

Major
Corporation

Large; three to four
teams of seven to
ten people; multiple
organizations

System engineer as
team lead

During 12 years of a two
decade acquisition program,
work on proposals and a
simulation tested for early
testing of integration among
system components

Small
Business

Small-medium; one
team of seven to
nine people

Lead software
engineer

Over 3 years, develop a
decision support tool for
helicopter crews.

University

Medium-large; two
Software engineer
to five people in each as team lead
of four to five teams
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As part of ongoing
maintenance and evolution of
a web based library service,
port the system from Unix to
Linux, over a six-month period

Small
Business

Medium; two to four
people in each of
three to four teams

Software engineer
as overall technical
lead

Continuously evolve a
multipurpose command-andcontrol system

Note. Adapted from “Using cognitive task analysis to explore issues in the procurement of intelligent decision
support systems,” by Hoffman, Neville, and Fowlkes, 2009. Cognition, Technology, and Work, 11, 57-70.

Data Analysis
To code the data, the element of analysis was defined. These elements were individual
sentences or chunks of narrative that express a single idea or concept; examples can be seen in
Table 5. The data elements were coded twice: using data-driven codes and using codes from
the HFACS framework.
Coders. Multiple coders (three in number; Coder A, Coder B, and Coder C) were trained
to code the data. Coder A performed both the data-driven coding and coding using the HFACS
categories, Coder B performed the data-driven coding and Coder C performed the HFACS
coding. Coder A was “HFACS certified.” He completed a HFACS super-user training seminar. To
train for the data-driven coding, coders A and B performed four iterations of coding. They
coded a subset of the data each time and then convened to compare codes and to develop a
shared understanding of the codes. To train for the HFACS based coding, Coder C reviewed
HFACS articles and performed two iterations of coding followed by feedback from Coder A.
Data-driven coding. Data analysis methods focused on identifying patterns and
relationships in the data. The data were first reviewed broadly to identify themes and possible
patterns and relationships. An initial set of data-driven codes were developed based on the
initial review and were used to code the data. More codes evolved during the second and third
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iterations of reviewing the data, and by going through relevant literature. Using the data-driven
coding approach, data elements were iteratively coded in a bottom-up, or data-driven, manner
by Coders A and B.
Table 5
Interview Transcripts as Data Elements
Data Elements
At <my company>, they have extensive processes. That has to do with the CMMI thing.
And we’re a level 4 wanting to become a level 5
Especially at level 5, that’s the highest. When you’re at that level...there’re benefits to it, but
there are some frustrations with it, too at times.

When data could not be coded using the existing codes, new codes were proposed and
introduced into the coding process. The codes developed by Coder B were handed over to
Coder A to compare against his set of codes. Coder A reconciled differences and produced the
final set of codes.
HFACS coding. The top-down approach involved coding the data elements with HFACS
categories. A subset of high-level HFACS categories was identified as potentially relevant to
systems thinking and systems development. These categories were used to code the data and
are listed in Table 6. HFACS categories such as “Preconditions for Unsafe Acts”, “Unsafe Acts”,
and “Unsafe Supervision” are not clearly relevant to systems thinking in the systems
development domain and so were not used as codes. Coder C handed over their codes to Coder

38

A to check for corroboration between the codes. Coder A reconciled the differences and
decided on the finalized set of codes to be included in the framework.
Table 6
Categories of HFACS Used to Code Data
HFACS Categories

Activities involved within the category

Resource Management

Resource management deals with managing budget
resources and excessive cost cutting.

Organizational Climate

Organizational climate includes: organizational structure
dealing with chain of command, delegation of authority,
and the communication channels present within the chain of
command; and organizational culture which includes
organizational customs, values, beliefs, attitudes, norms, and
rules.

Organizational Process

Organizational processes includes managing schedules,
procedures adopted to meet standards, and risk management

Note. Adapted from “A human error approach to aviation accident analysis: The human factors analysis and
classification system,” by Wiegmann and Shappell, 2003. Aldershot, Great Britain: Ashgate Publishing Company.

Three examples of coded data elements coded using HFACS categories are shown in
Table 7. Appendix C presents a set of example data elements and assigned codes.
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Table 7
Examples of Data Elements Coded Using HFACS Categories
Coder A
codes
Organizational
Process

Coder C
codes
Organizational
Process

Final
codes
Organizational
Process

Organizational
Climate

Organizational
Climate

Organizational
Climate

Team was a relatively large group
and was a changing group

Organizational
Climate

Organizational
Process

Organizational
Climate

From the company's point of view
it's tougher because there are so
many people on a project it is
tougher to tie you to the
performance of the project and it's
much more subjective.

Data Elements
At <my company>, they have
extensive processes. That has to do
with the CMMI thing.

Reliability assessment. To assess the reliability of coding, the percent of
correspondence between codes assigned by coders in each pair was determined. The process
adopted to calculate percent of correspondence between the coding pairs can be seen in
Appendix D. This process was again used to calculate the percent of correspondence between
coders in the HFACS based coding process.
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Results and Discussion
Correspondence Between Coders
The percent of shared codes for each of the six interviews can be seen in Table 8. Coders
A and B had 74.71% of data-driven codes in common, and Coders A and C had 81.81% of HFACS
codes in common.
Table 8
Correspondence Percentages
Coders
A-B
Data-Driven
(Bottom-up)

Coders
A-C
HFACS
(Top-down)

A

58.50%

73.07%

B

64.66%

84.15%

C

73.94%

85.70%

D

94.87%

84.60%

E

95.00%

96.67%

F

61.37%

66.67%

Average

74.71%

81.81%

Interview Transcript
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Data-Driven Coding
The initial set of codes obtained following a data-driven approach is shown in Table 9.
Table 9
Initial Set of Codes
Technical Issues
Coordinate Multiple Companies
Team Change Impacts
Requirements Emerge
Superior Personnel Pressures
Coordinate Multiple Teams
Organizational Structure Effects
Resist Changes
Management Culture Issues
Political Factors
Systems Development Process
Effects
Budget Constraints
Company Law Constraints
Customer Issues
Present Market Demand Effects

Management Change Effects
System Integration Issues
Procedural Issues
Quality Assessment Method
issues

Team Structure/Size Issues
Configuration Management
Timeline Pressures
Defective Future Plan
System Testing/Evaluation
Issues
Superior Company Dominance
Resource Issues
Requirements to Code
Transformation
Issues
Pressures from Smaller
Companies
Project Management Issues
System Complexity Issues

These initial codes were grouped into higher level categories which are:
 Systems development team
 Systems development project management
 Systems development technical activities
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Social Issues
Team Coordination
Work pressure
Communication
Issues
Consensus Issues

 External pressures
Initial codes that did not map well to the data were dropped and replaced by codes that
captured the content of the interviews. Dropped initial codes consist of:
 Resistance to change
 Management culture issues
 Company law constraints
 Management change effects
 Procedural issues
 Team-change impacts
 Resource issues
 Requirements to code transformation issues
The entire set of final codes is included as factors in the framework, as long as they
mapped to data in at least one interview. Codes that mapped to data elements in only one or
two of the interviews were flagged. These flagged codes were kept along with the codes
receiving stronger support because weak evidence for them in this particular study does not
disprove their relevance to systems engineering. Future research can shed more light on their
potential roles and, in the meantime, their inclusion in the framework may enrich the
framework’s support for systems thinking. The codes which had weak support were:
 Acquire Domain Knowledge (Used to code four data elements in one interview)
 Team Member Characteristics (Used to code two data elements in one interview)
 Contracting (Used to code nineteen data elements in two of the interviews)
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The data contained a great deal of information regarding teamwork. Teamwork
taxonomies by Marks, Mathieu, and Zaccaro (2001) and Smith-Jentsch, Zeisig, Acton, and
McPherson (1998), seen in Appendix E and F respectively, were identified and used to perform
a “finer-grained” analysis on teamwork. From this teamwork analysis, the codes that mapped
well to the data and found relevant to systems development are as follows:
 Mission Analysis and Planning
 Goal Specification
 Team Monitoring and Back-up Behavior
 Coordination
 Conflict Management
 Initiative
 Information Exchange
The final set of codes including their descriptions, can be seen in Appendix G. These
codes or factors, and their organization in this initial proposed framework will be discussed in
the section below.
The Systems Thinking Framework (STF)
The proposed Systems Thinking Framework (STF) consists of four tiers namely,
organizational influences, project management, team processes and technical activities. Each
tier has a set of factors associated with it. The external pressures factor envelops all the tiers.
Factors that were minimally supported by data (factors used only in one or two of the six
interviews) are outlined using dashed lines.
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The hierarchical representation of the STF shown in Figure 8 specifies four major
sources of influence on the technical activities, which is in the lowest tier. These influences are
changes and associated pressures in the external environment, organizational characteristics,
project management activities, and teamwork strategies. These sources of influences are
organized in the framework according to the extent to which they interface directly with and
directly impact the technical activities. The structure represents the way in which different
layers of an organization can influence the way work is conducted, a concept borrowed from
the HFACS framework.
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Figure 8. The STF structure. Note. Dashed lines around nodes indicate that a factor was found
only in one or two of the interviews. All the other factors were found in at least three of the
interviews.
46

Each of the STF tiers will be discussed below. The discussion will focus on the high-level
factors in each tier. The lower level factors are defined in Appendix B.
Organizational influences. The top tier, Organizational Influences, as seen in Figure 9,
consists of factors from HFACS that were found to be relevant to systems development. The
factors within this tier can be seen in Figure 9.

Organizational
Influences

Development
Philosophy

Organizational

Organizational

Climate

Process

Organizational Structure:

Operations:

#) Development team: Roles, Responsibilities,
and Relationships, including delegation of
authority and multi-company development
teams.
#) Customers, Users and Developers: Roles,
Responsibilities, and Relationships.
#) Leadership: Roles, Responsibilities, and
Relationships, including chain of command
#) Team Member Characteristics**

Organizational Culture:

#) Time Pressure
#) Schedules

Procedures:
#) Performance Standards
#) Procedures/instructions about
procedures.

Oversight:
#) Established risk management
programs.

#) Internal Politics, Competition, and Conflicts.
#) Attitudes about Management

Figure 9. Factors in the Organizational influences tier. Note. The factor indicated by ** indicates
a factor with weak support.
Development philosophy deals with philosophies, strategies advocated by the
organization for development and acquisition processes, and their influences on the system
development process. For example, one engineer, when discussing about the systems
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development processes and lifecycles, stated “I don’t like very long development cycles. I prefer
shorter development cycles that involves developing in groups and components and testing
those.” Another engineer, when asked about the systems development process used in the
project he was describing, stated, “We used object-oriented programming.”
The development philosophy adopted can affect the organizational processes and
procedures involved in a systems development effort. The system development process
adopted in a particular effort, should take into consideration the allocated budget and the time
for project submission, which are usually specified in the contractual requirements.
Organizational climate refers to the working environment and factors within the
organization that influence worker performance, such as the organization’s structure,
delegation of authority and responsibility, communication channels, openness to feedback, and
rigidity of processes. An organization’s policies and culture echo its climate. An engineer, for
example, stated, “The other lead and I had been introduced to everyone. We had a lot of
autonomy. The buck stopped with us. The managers were clueless. We, the two leads, had
decent trust and a decent rapport.” A healthy organizational climate should nurture mutual
respect and a healthy interaction between management and the technical personnel. Attention
to organizational climate factors could lead to changes in organizational policies that would
promote better teamwork and improve the quality of the product developed by the team.
Organizational process refers to the business decisions and rules that guide and
determine the day to day activities and processes that take place in an organization. As an
example, CMMI standards require an organization to follow a set or procedures. An engineer,
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describing about CMMI, reported, “We have a project plan, test plans, schedules, etc., that are
required by CMMI.” The engineer added, “The formalities are difficult.” Procedures that
influence the day to day activities might prove burdensome to the development teams.
Frequent checks and calibrations on the organizational processes would help the teams to
perform better.
Project management. The project managers should have a good awareness about the
complete systems development project. For example, one engineer reported “I’m the lead
person on this one project, and I probably have the best picture of this whole system.” Project
management influences the efficient working of the development team and hence the
production of quality products. A team lead said “I hated the Program Managers that didn’t
understand anything about what they were trying to build.” The development team’s
understanding of the processes involved in the systems development project might be affected
if the project manager’s knowledge of the domain is inefficient. The activities performed by a
project manager needs to be continuously checked. Thus, as an influence on the activities
performed by the development team, project management will be discussed below.
The second tier, project management, as seen in Figure 10, is composed of quality
management, customer and user expectations management, complexity management,
development team selection and contracting.
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Quality management activities in this framework involve risk management and
configuration management. Risk management deals with risk identification, assessment, and
prioritization; strategies adopted to manage risks; and the employment of resources in
response to unexpected events. Configuration management deals with documenting
requirements, changes in design, and operational information throughout a system’s lifecycle.
It is well known that improper documentation and management of the emerging requirements
increases the risk of a flawed design and development process and consequently contributes to
the development of a poor quality product and low customer satisfaction.
Talking about quality management, an engineer reported, “We’d do a mockup and the
business side would give feedback… we’d do a couple of iterations of this depending on the
complexity.” Poor quality management can increase the workload of the development team,
and lead to situations where the budget and schedule have not been met, thereby leading to
failed systems development efforts. The importance of efficient planning of budget and
50

schedule was also seen in the earlier discussion of “CHAOS REPORT,” where both budget and
schedule were the criteria behind a project’s success or a failure.
Managing changes in customer expectations and demands can be vital for a successful
systems development project. The activities performed by the systems development team
depend on the requirements of the customer. A project manager should effectively
communicate with the customers and address their expectations. For example, an engineer
stated, “People playing this role need to speak user and systems domains. It should be
someone who understands how software is designed, coded and built.”
Development team selection is another aspect for project management. An engineer,
describing about the development team in his organization, stated, “Within the team, people
were specialized but able to take over if someone was out.” The work done by the development
teams need to be regularly assessed by the project manager.
Complexity management, dealing with complexity of the system development work,
complexity of the system and its infrastructure, and strategies adopted to cope with
complexity, is another factor that might affect the work performed by the development team.
The complexity of a systems development project can be increased by changing customer
expectations, bigger development teams, poor configuration management, complex system
designs, time pressures, and workload pressures etc. Involving customers and getting their
feedback during the design and development process would help the development teams cope
with changing requirements. For example an engineer, describing about increasing complexity
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because of changing customer requirements, stated, “We talk to the customer and do a postmortem with them… As programs get bigger, change is more painful.”
Contracting deals with policies and decisions regarding contract agreements. For
example, en engineer reported, “So we were on the F-22 team which ended up winning out of
the prototyping phase, they actually built two planes. Prototyped them, and then ours got
selected for doing electronic warfare.” The contract agreements will usually decide the budget
and schedule allocated for a particular project. The systems development team should be
aware of these contract agreements to plan the design and development of the product.
Periodic checks could be used to ensure if the project manager is aware of and attending to the
contract details.
Team processes. The third tier of the framework Team processes, as seen in Figure 11 ,
is composed of communication and coordination, conflict management, mission analysis and
planning, team monitoring and back-up behavior, and building common ground and
awareness.. Team processes deal with various strategies the team members use to coordinate
to accomplish a task effectively. The interview data contained a great deal of information
regarding teamwork. Teamwork taxonomies by Marks, Mathieu, and Zaccaro (2001) and SmithJentsch, Zeisig, Acton, and McPherson (1998), seen in Appendix C and D respectively, were used
to assess the teamwork related data. The data tended to relate to conflicts, tensions, team
monitoring, information exchange, and shared understanding among team members, focused
on technical aspects of a system.
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In general, the importance of team processes tends to be neglected by the systems
engineering community.

Team Processes

Communication
and Coordination
Information
exchange
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Management
Preemptive
Reactive

Mission Analysis
and Planning
Goal
Specification

Team monitoring
and Back-up
behavior

Build Common
Ground and
Awareness

Initiative

Figure 11. Team processes
Communication and coordination refer to communicating information in order to
coordinate task sequences and timing. An example of interview data related to this factor is,
“has to be communication at some point between software and cognitive systems engineers so
that neither diverges too far from the other or that the application is headed towards the
unusable.” An engineer, in response to solving a problem due to poor communication amongst
team members, said “Usually, if there was a communication breakdown, the person’s
understanding of the problem would be sent out by email, detailing the problem to everyone
involved, followed by a meeting.”
Conflict management involves strategies adapted to deal with conflicts; preemptive,
which aims to prevent, control, or guide situation to preempt possible conflict, and reactive,
which involves working through task-related and interpersonal agreements among team
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members. The interviews suggested that internal conflicts are prevalent within the
development team. For example, an engineer stated, “We always had conflict with the
operations people.” Another engineer, when asked about possible conflicts between
development teams, said “Between functional and implementation teams. I’ve had quite a few.
This is a common one.”
Mission analysis and planning deals with the interpretation and evaluation of the team’s
purpose, identification of main tasks, assessment of available resources, detection and
response to changes in operative environment. It also involves Identification and prioritization
of goals for mission accomplishment. For example, an engineer describing about systems
development planning processes reported, “There was a simulation working group. So it had a
representative from the X system, from the radar system, from Company Y. And we met once a
quarter sometimes more often. And a lot of them were out of where Company Y was. So we
had quite a few meetings as a group to say ok, we had to agree on this fidelity of this simulator
and how we were going to interface it and how they were going to structure this. So there were
a lot of meetings to discuss that and try to work those things out. So then we would all work
together when it was final.”
Mission analysis also involves advocating a specific source of action, identifying team
priorities, and assigning tasks. For example, an engineer stated, “So the first thing they wanted
to do was before any of the other software was built, because they also did the build approach,
they said we want you to build a simulator, that’s going to simulate all of your interfaces.”
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Team monitoring and Back-up behavior involves cross-checking or monitoring
teammates for the purpose of assisting proactively, and providing/requesting assistance.
Talking about the importance of regularly assessing the work of development teams, an
engineer reported, “I think code reviews that are very beneficial, they are also called peer
reviews, is a more generic name. You can peer review a document, or code, or hardware
design. So there are many peer reviews all the way through the steps. I’ve seen that work very
well.”
Building common ground and awareness involves updating and educating the team
members about the day to day processes in the organization, changes in requirements, changes
in development methods, and creating awareness about contractual requirements like budget
and schedule. For example an engineer reported that they “taught one another new
technologies for knowledge transfer.” Efficient communication and coordination can bring
about common ground with respect to system development activities and plans. One engineer
stated “At the end of every week, the leads made a report of goals, deadlines, and activities
from the past week. They gave this to supervisors and distributed among team members. We
used verbal communication to clarify, and this kept us pretty well informed. We were
responsible for day to day operations and the supervisor needed to know. This is how we
communicated concerns and needs to others and tied together teams.”
Technical activities. The last tier of the framework Technical activities, as seen in Figure
12, includes requirement allocation and management, designing and developing the system
architecture, testing and evaluation process, integration of the components, and deployment.
55

Technical
Activities
Requirements
Management

Design and
Development

Integration
and
Interfacing

Testing and
Evaluation

Requirements
Development

Deployment
Integration with
operational
environment

Acquire
Domain
Knowledge

Maintenance

Requirements
Allocation
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Requirements management involves methods adopted to deal with the identification of
requirements, communication and allocation of requirements, and management of changing
requirements. Also involved are the problems faced in these methods. An engineer while
talking about requirements stated, “It’s basically your high level system requirements. So we
actually were following that traditional you know, common process. You start by getting your
high level requirements identified and then what we were attempting to do is take those
requirements and those exercises and say, we’ve got a phased implementation approach that
goes out over 6 phases. In phase 1, you’re going to get these requirements, phase 2 you’ll get
these requirements, phase 3 you’ll get these requirements and show how each one of those
maps to our plan. Novel concept you know, tell them what they’re going to get, when they’re
going to get it. Set all their expectations. And from there we started to drive our system
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architecture that we were going to put in place for phase 1.” Lack of user input, incomplete
requirements, and ineffective management of changing requirements could result in
development of a product with lesser functionality and therefore lack of customer satisfaction.
This necessitates the practice of monitoring the requirements regularly.
Design and development of the system includes the development process used; design
criteria, strategies and methods adopted; and issues dealt with during the process. McConnell
(1996, p. 63) states, “Design serves as the foundation for construction, project scheduling,
project tracking, and project control, and as such effective design is essential to achieving
maximum development speed.”An example given by an engineer, “And, you know, we were
trying to define the architecture at the same time we were capturing the requirements, cause
we had the first spiral drop we were trying to meet. So we were trying to get that core
infrastructure and architecture in place such that we could meet that first delivery.” Here the
engineer demonstrates the design and development process adopted. The requirements were
collected through the design and development phase, and the team was trying to meet the
schedule requirements.
Testing and evaluation refers to testing methods employed and issues related with
testing and evaluation. Referring to the testing processes involved in his system development
process, an engineer stated, “They wanted to do that testing. And so that’s one of the areas
where I got quite involved. We ended up having to develop these very complicated procedures
and stuff to try to do something similar to that but never did match the real plans we had. So
that is where we kind of went a different path and had to come up with these work-arounds to
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do the actual testing.” Testing is necessary to be done regularly to evaluate the developments
in the design process and check if the design requirements and the contractual requirements
are being met. Based on the results of testing and evaluation, decision makers can assess a
system’s readiness to advance to the next phase of development, risk reduction, and
requirements refinement.
Integration and interfacing includes issues related to integration of system components
like hardware, software and related processes. For example, one of the engineers, describing
the importance of system integration, reported, “Well that was the goal of the whole system.
What I worked on was an early delivery of that where we just did the interfaces to try to make
sure that all worked out. And then builds would actually be with the pilot. But yes it was early
integration.” Another engineer stated, “No tearing down the house to rebuild with new
materials—our materials were so different. We had to understand how parts do their thing to
support interfaces between parts.” In the above quote, the engineer reports the importance of
early analysis of interfaces between various system elements and how they have to be
integrated. Integration of system elements need to be monitored regularly to avoid the risk of
incompatibility of system elements which might lead to an overshoot of budget and schedule.
Proper documentation of the requirements, design reviews, coordination and timely
integration of the system elements may be useful to reduce the risk of incompatibility of all the
system elements at the time of review.
Deployment deals with issues that arise when the product is being delivered and
deployed at the operational environment. As an example, an engineer reported, “The first
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phase was developing these prototypes. The second one was developing the full plane. And I
just saw on the news the other day they have delivered the second full squadron of those
planes. We were developing the real thing the air force would use, the true final product. That’s
why it is called the actual manufacturing stage. Where out of that they start producing the
planes.” Through this quote the engineer suggests that the delivery of the final product to the
customers is absolutely vital as it decides whether the product is satisfactory to the customers
and that if the company can manufacture more products.
Deployment also includes maintenance, integration with the operational environment,
and ease of usability by users. Blanchard and Fabrycky (2011) state, “Traditionally, systems are
designed and developed, tested to ensure compliance with the initially specified contractual
requirements, delivered to the customer for operational use, and then often forgotten” (p.
166).They suggest that the complete maintenance cycle, supply support provisions, and
warehousing requirements are also important factors that need to be considered.
Acquiring domain knowledge involves acquiring knowledge about the project and the
product and a thorough understanding of the processes. Referring to domain knowledge an
engineer stated, “We’d just jointed the railroad legacy. There was catch up in domain
knowledge (i.e., the preceding/legacy system). The domain knowledge is what’s difficult. We
trusted that the manager’s view of the domain is accurate. He told us about the domain by
outlining system requirements: ‘here’s what the old system did and here’s what the new must
do.’ We were sitting there with a whiteboard, passing around books…domain books were
heaped on us—e.g., about vendor’s automatic braking systems and messaging protocols.” The
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engineer describes the process of educating the team members about the product and
customer requirements. He reports that the development team believes that the project
manager has adequate knowledge about the system and contractual requirements.
Regular monitoring and assessment of the work done by the development team, regular
meetings to promote effective communication among the team and with the customers,
thorough understanding of the project, processes involved, the customer requirements, and
knowledge about integration of the end product might help the systems development team to
perform efficient tasks.
External pressures. External pressures, as seen in the framework, envelopes all the tiers
and influence the system development team. For example, in an organization trying to meet
CMMI standards, the project managers and development team are pressured by the high level
management to do quality work efficiently enough to meet their high standards. For example,
one engineer reported “We have a project plan, test plans, schedules, etc. that are required by
CMMI.” He again stated, “In a fire drill, the formalities are difficult; we have adapted
lightweight versions of the processes. Done incorrectly, CMMI can kill your program.” Another
engineer said “Especially at level 5, that’s the highest. When you’re at that level...there’re
benefits to it, but there are some frustrations with it, too at times.” Through this quote, the
engineer describes about the increased pressures to meet CMMI standards. Regular checks and
calibrations have to be performed to monitor the work done by the development team and
check whether the processes associated with meeting an industrial standard is met.
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The next section will discuss about some of the problems dealt by the engineers, from
all the six interviews taken together, in their respective systems development project, and
which may affect the activities performed by the development team and could possibly lead to
a system development failure.
Factors to look out for. Two engineers describing about problems related to managing
requirements, reported about the problems arising due to ambiguous language used in
documentation. One of them states “Use cases are problematic because they are ambiguous
with respect to language”, and the other stated “Well some of the big things are the English
language, if you write out a requirement and you can word it out and it sounds perfect to you,
it gets the point across, someone else can read that and just get a totally different spin on it.” A
solution to this problem could be face to face communication with the customers. For example
one engineer reported “We would find out what the requirements were through just face to
face discussion.”
One engineer, talking about change management, reported “For almost all systems, the
number one risk is change. No software systems start with a set of requirements and that’s
what’s done. True requirements are said to be impossible to attain.” Another engineer said “As
programs get bigger, change is more painful.” Suggestions to deal with change include effective change management, understanding the emergent nature of the requirements,
effective configuration management, and effective interaction with the customers. An engineer
reported “Requirements creep during the development cycle. A lot of it is necessary, but it
should be limited. You have to have someone act as a liaison between people setting
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requirements and the developers. My supervisor was the liaison and people high up the
company set requirements—pretty general requirements for the most part.”
In an interview, talking about the “Design and Development,” factor in the “Technical
Activities” tier, an engineer stated, “The main problem is that people try to develop quickly
without thinking through the ramifications. Then there is the other extreme—spending too
much time on the design. The middle ground is to narrow down to only those features and
requirements that are necessary, but also putting quality into the software. Use use-cases to
cover the various things that might happen,” is a serious problem encountered in systems
development. He again stated “You can’t build in enough to address everything that might
happen. Try to limit the scope of the project by accounting for the most likely problems with
the first build. If things come up later you do have to take care of them.”
The section below will discuss about the framework’s attention to the human aspects of
the system.
Encouraging Attention to Human Aspects of Systems. A main goal behind developing
the systems thinking framework was to help developers attend to the large number of factors
that can influence the outcome of their work and, especially, the factors that can influence how
well a development team attends to social aspects of systems and to the integration of social
and technical aspects. To this end, framework factors that can contribute directly to the
integration of social and technical aspects have been identified post hoc. These factors consist
of ‘Acquire Domain Knowledge’ on the ‘Technical Activities’ tier, all teamwork strategies
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identified under ‘Team Processes’, and the factor ‘Complexity Management’ under the ‘Project
Management’ tier. Justification for selecting these particular factors is as follows:
Acquire Domain Knowledge – Acquiring domain knowledge is a type of technical work
that involves learning about the environment and activities in which a system will be
used. Acquiring domain knowledge is essential to both understanding the human
aspects of a system and integrating them with the technical aspects. This component of
systems development is where Goguen’s recommendations for using
ethnomethodology can be brought to bear.
Teamwork strategies – In the interviews, teamwork strategies were typically cited as
supporting teamwork among development team members as they worked on a
system’s technical components; the same strategies could facilitate teamwork between
members working on technical and human components of a system. Because people
working on technical and human system aspects often are trained in different disciplines
guided by differing systems development philosophies, the teamwork strategies may be
especially valuable—even vital—to the success of their working relationships.
Complexity Management - Complexity management encompasses strategies that are
used to either reduce or cope with the complexity of a system being developed or of the
systems development process. When the human aspects of a system are considered,
their consideration tends to introduce a great deal of complexity into the development
process and those aspects furthermore represent complexity that is often ignored
within the system being developed. Consequently, complexity management activities
may be critical to the success of a team that addresses a system’s human elements.
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In fact, the interview data did not address human aspects of systems or humantechnology integration, with very few exceptions. Similarly, the interviewees tended not to
relate the three factors listed above to human-technology integration. For example, a domain
analysis of the environment and activities in which a system would be used was described in
only one interview. One other interviewee used the term ‘domain analysis’ but it was in the
context of gaining an understanding of the engineering domain and engineering precedents.
The teamwork factors, when described by the interviewees, tended to relate to conflicts,
tensions, team monitoring, information exchange, and shared understanding among team
members focused on technical aspects of a system. Complexity management typically involved
technology decomposition and technology requirements management.
Support at the organizational and program management levels of the systems thinking
framework would likely be required for the three factors above to be used in support of
human-focused development activities and human-technology integration. Future research
could evaluate this hypothesis and future versions of the systems thinking framework may
further develop the roles and influence of these levels. More human-related activities may also
be added to the framework as additional research is conducted and the relationships between
specific activities and the probability of successful outcome are better understood. Generally
speaking, the integration of human and technology elements tends to occur well when
development work includes opportunities for human and technology elements to shape each
other (e.g., Benbya & McKelvey, 2006; Norman, 2004).
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Conclusion
With respect to the success of any systems development project, an engineer reported
“Quality, schedule, and functionality are success factors. Longevity; is it used in the long term –
this is another factor of success.”
This research made possible the development of a framework for analyzing
straightforward and underlying, or latent, reasons behind the neglect of critical systems
elements. Use of the framework should help development teams understand factors that can
lead to a development failure and look out for them in the future. The STF was developed to
improve systems thinking in systems engineering projects. The framework is expected to help
developers attend to a broader spectrum of system elements during development and should
reduce the risk of system development failure.
Use of the Systems Thinking Framework should help development teams to better
understand causal factors that can lead to development failures and look out for them in the
future. Systems engineering processes and projects should therefore become more effective
and more likely to result in a system in which all elements integrate well. Based on this present
research, we suggest a certain set of factors that systems development teams should look out
for; other factors may be added based on future work. Future work should additionally
investigate risks and strategies associated with the framework factors so that more specific and
useful guidance can be built into the framework.
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Appendix A: Description of the various categories in HFACS
Unsafe Acts
The unsafe acts of operators can be classified into two categories: errors and violations,
as seen in Figure 8. Errors include skill based errors, decision based errors and perceptual errors
that describe the mental or physical activities of aircrew or the pilots. Violations, on the other
hand, refer to the willful disregard for the rules and regulations that administrates the safety of
flight. They include routine and exceptional violations.

Figure 13. Categories of unsafe acts of operators. Adapted from “A human error approach to
aviation accident analysis: The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System” by D. A.
Wiegmann, and S. A. Shappell, 2003, p. 51. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company.

Errors. Errors can be classified into three types: skill based, decision, and perceptual
errors. Each of these is summarized below.
Skill-based errors. Skill-based errors usually occur when a pilot performs an action
without conscious thought or attention. These are basic actions that he does every day while
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flying. Errors such as the breakdown in visual scan patterns, task fixation, and the inadvertent
activation of controls are examples of skill-based errors.
Decision errors. Decision errors represent errors caused due to poor choices made
because of lack of knowledge or due to intentional behavior. Decision errors can be grouped
into three general categories: procedural errors, poor choices, and problem solving errors.
Procedural decision errors occur in aviation, because it has a number of rigid set of rules and
procedures to be followed (e. g., Orasanu, 1993). But sometimes in case of emergencies,
inexperience or time-critical situations, the pilots apply or decide to deviate from a procedure.
This may sometimes be a poor choice or sometimes even solve the problem.
Perceptual errors. Perceptual errors occur when sensory input is degraded; they include
visual illusions, spatial disorientation or misjudgment of an aircraft’s altitude, attitude, or
airspeed. Here, the illusion or disorientation is not considered as a perceptual error; but the
pilot’s erroneous response to the illusion or disorientation.

Violations. Violations are classified into two distinct forms, as summarized below.
Routine violations. This form of violation tends to be customary by nature and often
tolerated by governing authority (Reason, 1990). For example, supervisors or the controllers in
the tower tolerate pilots who fly into marginal weather, thereby creating a possibility of a
mishap.
Exceptional violations. Unlike routine violations, exceptional violations appear are
unpardonable actions, not necessarily indicative of individual’s typical behavior pattern or
condoned by management (Reason, 1990). For example, pilots engaging in prohibited
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maneuvers. These errors are considered exceptional because they are neither typical of the
individual making them difficult to predict. These violations have more probability of resulting
in a dramatic accident.

Preconditions for Unsafe Acts
Two major subdivisions, as seen in Figure 9, of unsafe aircrew conditions were
developed; substandard conditions of operators and the substandard practices they commit

Figure 14. Categories for preconditions for unsafe acts. Adapted from “A human error approach
to aviation accident analysis: The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System” by D. A.
Wiegmann, and S. A. Shappell, 2003, p. 56. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company.

Substandard conditions of operators. Substandard conditions of the operators are
characterized by the categories summarized below.
Adverse mental states. Adverse mental states relate to those mental conditions that
affect the performance of the air crew such as the loss of situational awareness, task fixation,
distraction, and fatigue due to sleep loss or other stressors including increased workload. Also,
personality traits and attitudes such as overconfidence, complacency, and misplaced
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motivation are also included in this category. If members of the aircrew, maintenance
department and the controllers are mentally fatigued, the possibility of an occurrence of an
error increases. Again, overconfidence, arrogance and impulsivity will influence an operator to
violate procedures.
Adverse physiological states. Adverse physiological states refer to those medical or
physiological conditions that prohibit safe operations such as visual illusions, spatial
disorientation, physical fatigue etc. When a pilot is ill, but still goes on to fly the effects of
visual illusions and spatial disorientation may affect his performance in the cockpit. Thus, it
becomes necessary for the supervisor to examine the condition of a pilot before he enters the
cockpit. If a supervisor fails to do this duty, the consequences may be appalling.
Physical/mental limitations. Physical/mental limitations refer to those instances when
mission requirements surpass the capabilities of the individual at the controls. For example,
while flying at night the human vision is severely impaired, yet the pilots sometimes do not take
enough precautions while doing their maneuvers or doing take off and landing. Unfortunately,
when precautions are not taken, the result can be catastrophic. Or sometimes, a pilot may not
be blessed with quick response time due to inexperience or due to genital reasons or his body
does not suit the requirements of a high- G environment. Now, when they are in an emergency
situation demanding them to respond quickly, they are helpless.

Substandard practices of operators. Substandard practices of the operators are divided
into two categories as summarized below.
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Crew resource mismanagement. Crew resource mismanagement accounts for
occurrences of poor communication and coordination among supervisors or the air traffic
controllers and the aircrew or the maintenance personnel. Effective communication and
coordination should be present among the personnel for flow of important information and for
producing a quality aircrew. The lessons learnt from the Valujet case study necessitate the
importance of an efficient aircrew and effective coordination and communication among the
personnel.
Personal readiness. Personal readiness failures occur when an operator or controller is
not physically or mentally prepared for duty. For example, violations of crew rest requirements
leading to physical fatigue or adverse mental states, and self-medicating will affect pilot or
aircrew performance. These might have calamitous consequences. Thus pilots and other crew
members should be physically and mentally fit and ready to do their tasks efficiently.

Unsafe Supervision
As explained before, efficient supervision plays a major role in producing high quality
aircrew. Errors in this level often lead to miserable consequences. Unsafe supervision, as seen
in Figure 10, can be classified into four categories: inadequate supervision planned
inappropriate operations, failure to correct a known problem, and supervisory violations.
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Figure 15. Categories for unsafe supervision. Adapted from “A human error approach to
aviation accident analysis: The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System” by D. A.
Wiegmann, and S. A. Shappell, 2003, p. 63. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company.

Inadequate supervision. A supervisor is required to provide guidance, training
opportunities, leadership, and motivation to produce an efficient air crew. In cases where
proper training was not given, leading to aircrew coordination skills being compromised and if
the aircraft hits an emergency situation, the probability of an error being committed and the
probability an accident would increase drastically. Also, a bad supervision leads to an incident
of a violation, again increasing the probability of occurrence of an accident/incident.
Planned inappropriate operations. Planned inappropriate operations relates to errors
committed when the crew is put into risky situations or when their work schedule becomes
overwhelming leading to physical and mental fatigue in normal and emergency situations. The
supervisor should be well organized with his time schedules and should be able to provide high
quality trainings to the crew to tackle any situation in the best possible manner. Any
shortcomings in these will have a fatal consequence.
Failure to correct a known problem. Failure to Correct a Known Problem refers to those
instances when a problem among individuals, equipment, and training are made known to the
supervisor, but still remain uncorrected. The failure to correct the deficit on the part of the
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supervisor will have a dire consequence in the end. For example, when a pilot is ill but still given
a flight status by the supervisor will lead to adverse mental and physical states while at flight
ultimately leading to a fatal accident. Thus, it is considered a violation on the part of the
supervisor, if he fails to correct a behavior or a problem which leads to an unsafe atmosphere.
Supervisory violations. Supervisory violations refer to those instances when supervisors
violate the rules and regulations. For example, letting a person fly without a pilot license is an
exceptional violation on the part of the supervisor.

Organizational Influences
These latent levels of human errors are known to influence the effective working of an
organization. Reason’s model also allows us to investigate the influences of these levels in the
causal sequence of the failure. Organizational Influences, as seen in Figure 11, are usually
related to resource management, organizational climate, and operational processes.

Figure 16. Categories for organizational influences. Adapted from “A human error approach to
aviation accident analysis: The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System” by D. A.
Wiegmann, and S. A. Shappell, 2003, p. 66. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company.

Resource management. Effective resource management includes the allocation and
maintenance of organizational assets such as human resources, monetary assets, and
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equipment and facilities. An efficient resource management usually results in effective time and
cost benefits. However in times of severe economical downfall, when funds are being cut, the
supervisors might not be motivated to work efficiently or might be forced to compromise on
the aircrew training. Also, when adequate facility is not being provided for training and
maintenance, the skill level and hence the quality of the aircrew, and also the performance of
the aircraft are put at stake.
Organizational climate. Organizational Climate refers to the working environment
within the organization such as the organization’s structure, delegation of authority and
responsibility, communication channels, that influences the worker performance. An
organization’s policies and culture echoes its climate. Policies for hiring and firing, promotion,
raises, sick leave, overtime plays a major role in the performances of its personnel.
Cultural elements such as values, attitudes of an organization, also play a major role in
satisfying the social needs of the personnel. Thus, when these needs are satisfied by the
organization, its workforce will be motivated to work efficiently bringing about a positive safety
culture. Deficiencies in a healthy organizational climate increase the probability of an accident.
Organizational process. Operational Process refers to business decisions and rules that
administer the day to day activities and processes that take place in an organization. For
example, establishment and application of operating procedures for maintaining checks and
balances between the workforce and management. These procedures determine the cadence
of the operations within the organization by directly influencing work schedules, deadlines etc.
We have already discussed the consequences of the deficiencies found in the above mentioned
factors. An organization should also be proactive and have official procedures to tackle
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contingency situations. This would help the other levels of the organization to continue working
efficiently even in emergency situations and provide a safe environment for the pilots.

Figure 17. The HFACS framework. Adapted from “A human error approach to aviation accident
analysis: The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System” by D. A. Wiegmann, and S. A.
Shappell, 2003, p. 71. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company.
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Appendix B: Retrospective Interview Questions
The following list of open-ended questions was used by Hoffman et al. (2009) in their
interviews with three of the six systems engineers.
What is the most complex system you have been involved in developing?
What is the most complex system development team you have been a part of?
What specific systems development project has had the most influence on your
approach and strategies for complex systems development?
What overarching systems development models and philosophies were used?
For the chosen development effort:
What systems development model was used?
Please describe the organizational structure used to support the effort.
 How large was the organization/team?
 Was it a hierarchical or a flat organizational structure
 How was work divided among groups?
 How large were groups/teams?
 How was group/team membership determined?
 Did members of a given group/team have different or shared task
responsibilities?
What processes and mechanisms were used to communicate and coordinate within and
across teams, e. g., with regard to:
 Specific development sub-objectives/milestones?
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 The overarching design/vision?
 Progress?
 Changes in requirements?
 Design updates?
 Customer/user feedback?
 Schedule changes?
 Design deficiencies?
 Other…
In the selected effort, who or what team was responsible for designing the aspects of
the system that would affect user performance, i.e., that would be interfacing with
users? In particular, what types of expertise did team members have?
 What did this team contribute to the system design?
 Was this aspect of system development successful?
 Did the contributions of this team make it into the developed system?
 Did their contributions add to the success of the effort? In what ways?
 By what processes did their contributions become incorporated into the larger
system design?
 By what processes did their contributions become incorporated into developed
product?
 To the extent they were successful, what contributed to their success?
 What were impediments to their successful contribution?
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 What did this team do right in terms of coordinating with the team and
contributing to the design?
 What could this team have done to better coordinate with the team and
contribute to the design?
What articles were adopted to support the effort (e. g., what different types of plans,
diagrams, etc? How were requirements documented and communicated)?
What procedures were used to minimize communication/coordination breakdowns? ,
and what procedures were used to recover from communication/coordination
breakdowns? (within and across teams)
How to develop effective functional requirements?
What methods were used to identify and build requirements?
How do you handle changing requirements?
How did the business side come upon their expectations/requirements?
What processes and mechanisms were used to assess quality?
What were the sources of conflict within the development team as a whole during the
effort?
What strategies were used to resolve conflicts or developed to avoid future conflicts?
Was this development effort considered successful? Based on what criteria would you
consider it successful?
Was the effort successful from the standpoint of the intended users? Was it delivered to
the users? Did it help them perform their work, allow them to do their work more
quickly or efficiently, or allow them to do and/or understand more? What was the
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experience of the intended users once the system was delivered (if it was delivered)?
Did it meet user expectations? How was user satisfaction assessed?
Were changes to the system requested following delivery? If so, what types of changes?
How were they accomplished?
What specific systems development experience, class or book has had the most
influence on your approach and strategies for complex systems development?
Based on your general experience, what do you see as the most common problems and
most serious problems encountered in systems development?
What strategies do you think might help prevent or minimize these problems?
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Appendix C: Coded Interview Transcripts
Table 10
Coded Interview Transcripts
Data-Driven
(Bottom-up)

HFACS
(Top-down)

Interview Chunks

DT-OC-IPC

RM

Two lead engineers, including me, were stolen from another
team.

DT-OC-AM
DT-OS-D

OC

So we had 2 leads, 4 regulars, and 4 contractors, all of whom
had not worked together. There was no established trust
among these groups, and their management.

DT-OC-DP
DT-OS-D
SDTA-D

OC

SDTA-D

NIL

DT-OS-D

DT-OC-IPC

NIL

OC

• We divided the work.
• I took a part—a big box from the high-level view.
• It was a type of work where if you did it using classical 1-up
solutions, it’d have been boring work. I wanted it to be more
interesting. Sees that now as his motivation.
• I’d use more elegant ways than classical methods. These
would be object-oriented techniques using advanced
methods like design patterns (I had been studying these
things on my own time).
• I want the challenge of moving methodology ahead.
I developed a high-level framework for communicating to
the 20 protocols/system blocks based on XML. We used an
XML messaging program manager instead of 20 different
messaging protocols.
[Prompted to return to timeline of the story]
• First, we joined the team and divvied up the work
• I immediately knew what sort of approach I wanted to use.
• Probably 2nd week, I chose the XML based approach.
• Then I went off and did the work.
• During the first few weeks, I got to know a young engineer.
I hooked up with him as my protégé. He was assigned to
another lead. I persisted to get this guy on my team. May
have traded two contractors for him.
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DT-TC-IN
DT-TC-IE
DT-TC-COOR

OC

DT-OC-IPC
DT-TC-TM

OC

DT-OC-AM
DT-TC-CfM

OC

DT-TC-TM
DT-TC-COOR
DT-TC-IE

NIL

DT-OC-IPD
DT-OC-AM
DT-OS-L

OC

• That guy was in my face: “What do I do?” and forced me to
lay down a framework so I could feed and engage him.
• I had to think of the “little boxes” inside my big boxes so I
could describe his work logically. There is not a good way to
communicate in Software-ese: “I need these inputs and these
outputs, and this is how I need it on the inside.”
• He’d work for two days and then come back to me.

[I think he was prompted here regarding previous comment
about scared manager/boss]
Bits and pieces of what we were doing trickled out as we
worked so he [the manager] could tell we were doing
something adventurous.
He didn’t demand details. I didn’t provide details or
communicate. I believe you should do everything you can
without involving your management. But we had no history
[of working together]. He chose to trust me rather than
confront me, but he was very stressed the whole time I found
out later.
• In the last two weeks, it seemed to be coming together. We
trickled out details to my peer lead. He was impressed and
told his contractors and then they wanted it [the XML
framework] for something else. The contractors went away
and tested it and I was surprised when they came back and
said ‘we like it, and it will save us lots of time.’

You mentioned other contractors and team members…that
you traded 2 contactors for someone. Did you interact with
others? The other lead and I had been introduced to
everyone. We had a lot of autonomy. The buck stopped with
us. The managers were clueless. We had decent trust and a
decent rapport (the 2 leads). He got there a before I did and
had already grabbed Jared (the young software engineer
mentioned above). I came in a week later and he had all the
people. Managers told him to give me people. I joked for a
week about how all I needed was Jared and he could have the
rest. Finally I told him I’m serious, You get 4 contractors, I get
Jared. At that point, I had the guy (Jared), the autonomy, the
concept. Nothing could stop me.
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DT-TC-IE
DT-OC-IPC

OC

Did you interact with the other lead? Did he have to know
what you were doing? • We’d have meetings and see each
other once in a while. I later realized maybe he could use
what we were developing.
• We were on completely parallel paths. I didn’t think our
work was relevant to his at first; didn’t know what he was
doing. Didn’t know he could use it…but he later benefited
from it tremendously.

DT-OC-AM
DT-OC-DP
DT-OS-L

OC

• The overriding purpose of segregating blocks (of high-level
diagram) is it allowed us to work in parallel and
independently until integration.
• We had weekly formal meetings and took advantage of the
fact that the managers were clueless. Used them to report
resource issues—were contractors being used appropriately.

PM-BS
DT-TC-IE

OP

Schedule slippages would have been reported.

DT-OS-D
PM-QM-RM

OP

• With highly divided duties, you don’t have to talk. The
things we had in common were:
o Software had to integrate into computers on the
locomotive
o Integration of his and my pieces
• There was a thread between him and me—whether
software would run on embedded PCs. This was a risk for us
both.

DT-OS-L
PM-QM-RM

OP

DT-TC-IE

NIL

• Risk mitigation is a parallel thread (for leads). As your teams
are working, Leads work on risk items.
What did you do on a daily basis? What did you work on,
what did Jared work on? How did you work together?
He didn't have the luxury of being handed a stack of material
to study and then meeting to go over them.
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DT-OS - M
DT-TC-COOR

NIL

The first one is, you know, in terms of difficult
or challenging - when you get into structured environment
like we were on…tactical trainer. We were tasked to replace
the shore based systems that they have both in the Atlantic
&
Pacific… * inaudible +…perfect routine… * inaudible +VMH
* inaudible +……

DT-OS-M
DT-TC-COOR

OC

It was a government led effort so you had 6
companies with the government technical lead so all the
companies were kinda running off doing their own little
things and you weren’t getting consistent direction from the
government picking

DT-TC-GS

NIL

the government lead saying, go this way, go
that way.

OC

So you have a lot of different approaches and ideas
and nobody centralizing them all in one path folder. So how
do you pull something like that together when nobody’s in
charge, if you will?

DT-OS-LD
DT-TC-GS

OC

Your government lead is supposed to be
in charge but they are not strong enough as a leader to kinda
really grab the team and say, we’re gonna go that way.

SDTA-REQ

OC

Especially if your customer doesn’t know exactly what
you’re looking…what they’re looking for and the lots
of different alternatives and options that are out there.

RM

And
you get 6 different companies coming in selling them on the
way they wanna go because it suits them the best. How do
you pull that together?

RM

There’s really no set answer for that
you know, how to do that. You hope that your government
lead nominates somebody and says * inaudible + they’re in
charge and move out. We’re gonna listen to them and move
forward but it doesn’t always work that way.

DT-TC-COOR
DT-OS-LD

DT-OC-IPC
DT-OS-M

DT-OS-LD

Nil

NIL

Most of the other things were just technical
challenges more than problematic challenges and how
to actually implement your process through something like
this.
87

DT-OS-M
DT-TC-COOR
PM-QM-CM

DT-OS-M
DT-OC-IPC
DT-TC-CfM

NIL

OC

EP-P
DT-OC-DP

OC

DT-OC-DP

OC

DT-OS-M
EP-P
DT-OC-DP
DT-TC-COOR

RM

You may have a system design process and
development process that you want to put in place but if
company A over here doesn’t necessarily follow those you’re
gonna get different products that are gonna come out from
that type of thing so, ahmm… that’s probably the best one.
I can relate back to the same type of thing where ahmmm
you’re getting ahhm when you have those distributed teams
and one person has a solution that you don’t necessarily
agree with because it promotes their ahh agenda, or their
product or you know, those types of things that you feel
going this direction would be better off.
In defense, another example, of [totalship] training, things
that we’ve done in the past where you have real legacy
people that are involved with a program they’re very stone
pipe in the way they think and you’re coming in with a new
technology or new way to approach it. They don’t always see
that as the right way because it’s gonna replace them as the
entrenched one with the government customer and ahhh, so
you constantly fight when you try to introduce new
technologies and new ways of doing things that they don’t
always want….(laughs)… welcome those…there’s even your
government customers for some times ahmm, they don’t
recognize the power of some of the capabilities.
And I think we ran into that with Gertz a little bit. Our
[inaudible ]solution that we had was a complete change from
what they’re used to and I don’t think the presentation came
across as well as it should have in a proposal effort…(laughs).
Ahmm, you know, so you run against the political factors of
you know, hey, we like this subcontractor over here and we
like their reputation so we’re gonna go that way and not
necessarily go what we’ll call disruptive technologies and
allow you to introduce new ideas new concepts that goes
away from what they’re used to. Replace some of those
legacies , capabilities that are there.
I can go back a few years to some stuff that we’d done on, for
the Army...on like close combat tactical trainer and it’s very
similar types of problems where you’ve got an integrated
development team trying to execute and at that time
Lockheid Martin was the prime trying to get…and they had
supposed oversight over all the other companies trying to get
things to execute on schedule and those types of things.
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But they weren’t very effective at integration?

DT-OS-M
DT-TC-COOR
PM-PR,BS

OP

DT-OS-LD
PM-PR,BS

OP

DT-OC-DP

RM

EP-P
PM-QM-CM

OP

DT-OC-DP
EP-P

OP

Not initially. I mean any large kinda program, I mean, you can
bid it as a 3-year, 4-year program, it’s gonna take you 6 years
to get it done. When you’re talking integrating multiple
companies like that and ahh if all the requirements where
your customer is not exactly sure what they want and you
doing a spiral development so you do something they get a
chance to review it and make comments well, those
comments that they’re providing based on that review you’re
already 6 months into the next spiral and they’re making cuts
so you’re constantly playing catch up. And so you’re spitting
spiral spiral may be December ’05 but you’re getting
comments back in June of ’05 and there’s no way you’re
gonna get it rolled in until that final delivery so you’re gonna
be a year or better out from when you’re supposed to be
finally delivering.
The government has to recognize those types of things
when…when they’re providing that feedback in the spiral
processes, that it’s not gonna end on a set date they have to
have plans out. A lot of them have gotten a lot better at that,
at planning things that go past the PCPs or change requests
or things like that they’re … you know, you’re not done
December ‘05 you’re gonna make a drop in December ’05
and there are gonna be changes that need to be…you gotta
plan and budget those types of things.
We were an open system so we didn’t build you know like the
traditional Lockheid Martin proprietary solutions that nobody
else could play in unless they wanted to give you that
information which they typically didn’t want to do.

At <my company>, they have extensive processes. That has
to do with the CMMI thing.

And we’re a level 4 wanting to become a level 5
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EP-P

OP

Especially at level 5, that’s the highest. When you’re at that
level...there’re benefits to it, but there are some frustrations
with it, too at times.
Maybe we’ll start off with you telling us a little bit about your
background and career. Do you have a label, like a systems
engineer?

NIL

PM-PR

EP-P

DT-OC-DP
SDTA-D

SDTA-D

OP

That’s my current job title. Backing up, I have an Industrial
Engineering (IE) undergrad, a Master’s in IE within
manufacturing engineering. I was doing a lot with
automation. Started with General Electric (GE) in their
automation program. They had a big push in “factory of the
future.” So they were trying to train some experts and I got
selected for that. And I moved around. Every six months
they moved you to a different automation area.

OP

But then as I was starting to graduate from the program, GE
said oh, factory of the future is not as big as we thought it
would be. So we’re closing that whole department. ...so the
training program got cancelled.

RM

So then I left there and ended up going to a small company
for a year. And that was when the tech bust happened and
got laid off from there.

OP

Spiral and those... What we’re planning on for this current
project is doing—they call it modified spiral in the sense of
it’s more of, we’re kind of taking different builds, and build
that, and then go back, and do the second build, and the third
build. They’re overlapping with each other but they are
staggered so that you can be adding lessons learned from the
first one back into the second and third ones.

NIL

The first one only does simple communication between all of
the devices. Might have it do a simple self test or something.
Second one adds more functionality and the third one ads full
functionality.
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In general, when you’re using this modified spiral, how do
you develop the requirements?

SDTA-REQ
DT-OC-DP
SDTA-D

OP

SDTA-D
EP-P

RM

PM-BS
PM-QM-RM
SDTA-D

OP

DT-OC-DP

OC

We try to develop requirements for the whole system.
Because you can’t really get into the spiral unless you really
know what you’re building for the whole system. And even
the preliminary design which is the second step, we pretty
much do all of that because you want the whole design
structure that will deal with the whole functionality. As you
get into detail design is where you start separating it down.
For our system, our hardware is going be (more and more
systems are going this way today) is going to be pretty
generic hardware there are going to be regular P.C’s that
we’ll be running on. There will be some dedicated cards that
we are running on to filter the incoming signals. But it’s going
to be fairly standard. Years ago there was a very tight
connection between the hardware and software.
So like one of the discussions we are having right now is
laying out the schedule, and always in the years in the past
we have had all the key reviews where you review the
requirements, and you do the preliminary design review and
the critical design review. So as you go through it’s always
been hardware and software. In the Hunts program we are
proposing that we are going to stager those. The hardware is
running much ahead of the software because it’s like I said,
pretty standardized. They’re using some off the shelf stuff.
But they were saying “How can you do that? You need to
keep them in line” and it’s because of the way we are using
more of these work station type approaches. The software
designs are going to run in generic work stations. It’s not as
critical to have them as closely tied together.
Ok, one area that was where we kind of went a different way
than was an approach was when I was working on the F-22
program down here I was kind of like leading the hardware
integration and getting the system working than doing the
low level work and all that.
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SDTA-T
DT-OS-M

OC

SDTA-T
SDTA-D

RM

SDTA-T
PM-ChM

OP

DT-OS-C
SDTA-REQ

OC

SDTA-REQ

OP

DT-OS-D

OC

And there was a different group developing the functional
software that was going to run in all the hardware. And they
had planned on doing these fairly detailed testing of
everything and they had planned to do it as you would
normally do it.
With a software debugger where you could insert values, and
then control the flow of the code and verify, when you put
these designated inputs in you get this output and you can
test the functionality of the software. The problem was that
the debuggers system we had since this was custom
hardware that was that sophisticated and you also had
parallel processes and things going on. So we ended up with a
lot of problems about being able to configure it as well as it
wasn’t as controllable.
They wanted to do that testing. And so that’s one of the
areas where I got quite involved. We ended up having to
develop these very complicated procedures and stuff to try to
so something similar to that but never did match the real
plans we had. So that is where we kind of went a different
path and had to come up with these work-arounds to do the
actual testing.
I don’t know as much as you’d say this is a different path, the
current projects I’m working on, in the past certainly they
are, and most of the places I’ve worked, the customer
normally comes in and says “Ok here are the system level
requirements, this is what we want you to build a system for.
And we are giving you the requirements.” On this
modernization project they actually came, they got money
from congress, and the Navy said “Well we want to
modernize these. Go figure it out.” So they actually brought
us in early that’s what we have been doing the last year,
determining the requirements for the system so we were
helping them determine how best to modernize it so we are
coming up with our own requirements.
So we developed all these requirements given to them, and
we reviewed them and discussed. And now we are actually
doing the job and it’s really strange because now all the stuff
we wrote is coming back as requirements.
This project was complex and had a complex team—
collaboration among 15 different universities
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NIL

OP

We were taking daily feeds of news and magazines and
automatically loaded them into the website; we’d mark them
up for reading level and categorize. It was redone
incrementally. We wrote the whole thing.
For the chosen development effort:

PM-CxM
DT-OC-DP
SDTA-D

DT-OC-DP
EP-S

DT-OS-D

OP

OP

OC

3. What overarching systems development model/s and
philosophy/ies were used?
- I tried to keep things modular, tried to adhere to a rough
framework…system was broken into chunks, any chunks.
- We used object-oriented programming…a lot of the code
was old…hundreds of providers were using their own format
and we had to translate that…”filter” it using our own filter.
- The object-oriented approach helped with re-use.
We tried to make things backward compatible; we had to
work with both old and new.
- Any time we changed something that ran across multiple
modules, we had to test.
- It was more of a spiral development effort…make changes
to pieces then roll them out to production—then make
changes to other pieces, etc.—tried to produce subsets at a
time rather than hold everything back.
- One major change was that we changed to distributed
multi-host software that required change throughout the
software—6 months of development; 1 month of test.
4. Please describe the organizational structure used to
support the effort.
- My team was focused on getting feeds and loading them
into a database. It had about six people on it.
- Another team was focusing on how to retrieve the search
results. I had 2 to 3 people.
- Another team of 3-4 people was handling web-based
development.
- There were a lot of off-shoots to different types of products.
- Each team had a lead; some people handled daily reports
generated; another (person) handled feeds from satellites,
etc., within the team people were specialized but able to take
over if someone was out.
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5. What processes and mechanisms were used to
communicate and coordinate within and across teams, e.g.,
with regard to:
DT-TC-CfM
DT-TC-COOR
DT-TC-BCG

OC

DT-TC-BCG

OC

DT-TC-CfM
DT-TC-BCG

NIL

DT-TC-BCG
PM-QM-CM

OP

PM-QM-CM
DT-OS-D

OP

- Within the team:
o If we had a problem, we’d go to one another
o We had monthly meetings within the team
o Kept track of goals and taught one another new
technologies for knowledge transfer.
- Between teams:
o Team leads and supervisor had weekly meetings on current
objectives; this was a formal communication
o Lots of informal communications
o At the end of every week, the leads made a report of goals,
deadlines, and activities from the past week. Gave this to
supervisors and distributed among team members. We used
verbal communication to clarify, and this kept us pretty well
informed. We were responsible for day to day operations and
the supervisor needed to know. This is how we
communicated concerns and needs to others and tied
together teams.
6. What procedures were used to minimize
communication/coordination breakdowns? What procedures
were used to recover from communication/coordination
breakdowns? (within and across teams)
Usually, if there was a problem due to a communication
breakdown, the person’s understanding of the problem
would be sent out by email, detailing the problem to
everyone involved, followed by a meeting.
7. What artifacts were adopted to support the effort (e.g.,
what different types of plans, diagrams, etc? How were
requirements documented and communicated?)
There were no formal documents…well, actually we did…
- whenever we had a new content provider. We’d send the
new content provider a form in which they would specify
their data format, and then we’d sign off on it.
- We’d write up documentation for the software. Big sections
of comment on the use of a module were written at the
beginning of the code for that module.
In the case of a big change or a new technology, we’d write
standalone documentation for it. The Lead ensures this
happens.
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DT-TC-BCG
SDTA-T
DT-TC-IE

OP

SDTA-REQ
DT-OS-C

OP

DT-OS-D
PM-QM

OP

SDTA-REQ

OP

SDTA-D
PM-QM

OP

SDTA-D

OP

A number of different reports were generated weekly:
o My report: a high level report of activities, problems, goals,
and deadlines
o One of my people: What documents came into the system
and from where, broken down statistically (how many
documents, what types…)
o Time to time we were asked to write special
reports…usually for business reasons, and sometimes for
technical reasons, e.g., if a server was becoming overloaded
8. What methods were used to identify and build the ‘full’ set
of requirements?
We would find out what the requirements were through just
face to face discussion…”the business people” would tell us
what they were after. Our users were internal.
We had procedures in place for a new content provider. We’d
make a pass at the software and then send it to a QA person
to make sure there were no problems. The business side
would look at the final product to see if it was what they had
in mind.
How did the business side come upon their
expectations/requirements?
They identified more formal requirements based on market
research done on the business side. They’d look at other
products, talk with users, and do some formal surveys.
9. What methods were used to create the system design and
the design artifacts?
- We’d do a mockup and the business side would give
feedback…we’d do a couple of iterations of this (mockup->
feedback) depending on the complexity.
Technical details that weren’t visible to the outside were our
prerogative…we just had to ensure we met certain
constraints:
o Had to ensure compatibility with other modules
o Search time couldn’t be more than 5 seconds
o Disk space, server resource issues (resources brought in to
handle expansion)
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SDTA-T
PM-QM

OP

NIL

NIL

DT-OC-DP
SDTA-REQ
PM-ChM

NIL

NIL

OC

PM-CxM
DT-OS-D

RM

10. What processes and mechanisms were used to assess
progress/status?
and
11. What processes and mechanisms were used to assess
quality?
- We did assessment via an automated system we built to
monitor the availability of the system/website and to make
sure that what gets turned up in the searches makes sense.
1. What is the most complex system you’ve been involved in
developing?
- What about this system made it complex?
C3Core, because it’s been developing for close to 10 years
and due to ever-changing user requirements, functionality
sets, and architecture, and making sure it’s set up for future
changes.
For almost all systems, the #1 risk is change. No software
systems start with a set of requirements and that’s what’s
done. True requirements are said to be impossible to attain in
software engineering (versus manufacturing engineering)
Software architectures can’t be seen the way house
architectures can be.
2. What is the most complex system development team
you’ve been a part of?
- What about this team made it complex?
C3Core, because over the course of 10 years, people come
and go bringing different skills and tool sets. It’s a very
dynamic team.
3. What specific systems development project has had the
most influence on your approach and strategies for complex
systems development?
- At a high level, describe how the experience has influenced
you.
The biggest thing is getting everyone synchronized; forming
group consensus is very very difficult. Programs don’t scale
linearly; as the number of people grows, the amount of
information increases exponentially. Teams with more than
about 10 people don’t work because you can’t get consensus.
Divide the team into subdomains or projects and coordinate
between groups. If you don’t subdivide the team correctly, it
won’t work (allocate work to appropriate people…)
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For the chosen development effort:
SDTA-D

OP

PM-BS
DT-OC-DP
DT-OS-D

NIL

DT-OS-D

RM

EP-S
PM-QM-CM
DT-OC-DP

OP

NIL

OP

PM-QM-CM

OP

4. What systems development model was used?
Evolutionary and Spiral type of design. Each program (add-on
to C3Core) brings its own constraitns.
5. Please describe the organizational structure used to
support the effort.
Small teams of 1-4 people working on a task using very short
1-2 week spirals of development. Short spirals help keep
people from diverging in their thinking; provide frequent
checkpoints.
Everyone has an expert domain area (e.g., GIS system,
database), and everyone is cross-pollinated into other areas,
e.g., when a subsystem spills into the GIS system the two
associated teams cross-pollinate (=how?).
Team is not big enough to have dedicated designers, testers,
coders; Generally, the team is involved through the
requirements phase, design phase, etc. with the best team
member for each phase designated as the point person.
The team is augmented with external supervision in the guise
of QA. This role reviews requirements, design, and
implementation.
6. What artifacts were adopted to support the effort?
Informal processes are becoming more formalized. We have
a project plan, test plans, schedules, etc. that are required by
CMMI. Before, we used white-board sketches, oral schedules,
weekly progress meetings (which still happen).
CMMI helps or hurts?
In a fire drill, the formalities are difficult; we have adapted
lightweight versions of the processes. Done incorrectly,
CMMI can kill your program; it’s easy to generate docs; hard
to generate good docs. A bad doc can really throw a team off.
CMMI helps or hurts?
In a fire drill, the formalities are difficult; we have adapted
lightweight versions of the processes. Done incorrectly,
CMMI can kill your program; it’s easy to generate docs; hard
to generate good docs. A bad doc can really throw a team off.
Classic lesson learned: when I was a project manager at
DuPont, the heating system steam pipe came to the heating
system with a gap of 6 inches. I couldn’t sign off on the
system, but the engineer said, “Well, look at the document,”
and sure enough…
Once an artifact is created it has to be maintained.
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Paperwork should lead you forward, not be a diary.

PM-QM-CM

SDTA-REQ

OP

NIL

SDTA-REQ

OP

SDTA-REQ

OP

PM-ChM
SDTA-REQ

OP

CMMI should involve creating an artifact trail so you can
backfeed a design implementation all the way back to the
money. Level 3 (level used by interviewee) involves gathering
artifacts.
7. What methods were used to identify requirements?
Requirements come at different levels. We get high-level
requirements…well what does this really mean?
Requirements include:
- Program/Project Requirements
- Software Requirements
- Test Requirements
Depends on your business model, too. We’re using other
people’s money to develop software we can sell.

How do you identify requirements?
If the customer gives you good requirements, then you
analyze them for gaps and conflicts: Are they good? Missing
things?...and as you do that, what implied requirements need
to be there to build this monster?
How do you identify gaps and conflicts?
We take a schoolbook approach to decomposing the
requirements given us by the customer (“Fish out of
water…”—??)
High level functional descriptions is where we start, via
storyboarding or CRC cards (mini use-case; we write a
function on each card and group the cards [card sorting]). We
also use brainstorming and what-ifs.
Use cases are problematic because they are ambiguous with
respect to language.
How do you handle new and changing requirements?
Build an open and flexible architecture. It’s always like a
crapshoot, you have to do it at least 3 times to get it right.
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SDTA-REQ
PM-ChM

OP

DT-OC-DP
PM-ChM
PM-BS

RM

DT-OS-D

NIL

DT-TC-COOR

NIL

DT-TC-COOR

OP

DT-OS-M

NIL

What’s “doing it right?”
Doing it right means it survives the test of time and survives
re-use. By about the 3rd time they’ve got it right, and on
every iteration it goes faster.
A spiral, evolutionary prototype design approach was used
for FCS.
There’s new software, new hardware, new languages…every
few months. Any program has to be adaptable. You have to
understand requirements will change and have to insulate
yourself from that. Programs, including C3Core, take smaller
chunks, e.g., four 1-mth blocks of development, demo once a
month, wait for change requests, and then assess new
requirements and inform customer regarding costs,
tradeoffs, etc.
1. What is the most complex system you’ve been involved in
developing?
IE NATOPS.
What about this system made it complex?
team was a relatively large group and was a changing group.
I came in late
It was a tablet-based application. Tablets were a new
technology for me. I wasn’t sure what we were trying to do or
what could be done
2. What is your most complex system development team
involvement?
- What about this team made it complex?
- 2 ½ software engineers; the ‘1/2’ was coordinating with
Penn State
- project manager
- subject matter expert
For the chosen development effort:

PM-BS
DT-OS-DP

OP

3. What overarching systems development model/s and
philosophy/ies were used?
- I’m usually working on two to three projects at a time. This
affects the sequence and how and why I do things.
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DT-OS-DP

OP

DT-OS-DP

OC

DT-TC-COOR

OC

DT-OS-D

NIL

DT-OS-TMC

NIL

In retrospect, I’m a proponent of agile development. Don’t
over-design upfront. Do just enough design to get
implementation going and to meet short term objectives. Get
functional specs going, get some software going, and then
reconcile the two. The size of the system makes this more doable. Since we were doing research…what’s possible? This
model supports exploration of technology and what it allows
you to do.
e.g., Word and browser and cell phone: combine them,
validate, then design more based on the results. You don’t
know upfront if it will work.
Has to be communication at some point between software
and cognitive systems engineers so that neither diverges too
far from the other or that the application is headed toward
the unusable (due to a divergence from what’s possible).
- Hand-in-hand development
- XP (extreme programming); agile development
4. Please describe the organizational structure used to
support the effort. For example:
- how large was the organization/team?
- was it a hierarchical or a flat organizational structure?
- how was work divided among groups?
- how large were groups/teams?
- how was group/team membership determined?
- did members of a given group/team have different or shared
task responsibilities?
- The organizational structure was somewhat hierarchical.
There was a functional group and a financial group.
Functional was divided into two groups--one focused on what
we were going to do (the functional people) and the other
group focused on how we were going to do it (the
implementation people).
Team membership was defined based on availability,
philosophy, and had to have someone who could analyze
technology.
The ‘How we’re going to do it’ team had to include people
who could: ID hardware; make the interface build itself
dynamically; figure out how to switch from day to night
lighting; and architect the overall application.
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5. What processes and mechanisms were used to
communicate and coordinate within and across teams, e.g.,
with regard to:
- specific development sub-objectives/milestones?
- the overarching design/vision?
- progress?
- changes in requirements?
- design updates?
- customer/user feedback?
- schedule changes?
- design deficiencies?
- other…
DT-OC-DP
DT-OS-D
DT-TC-IE

NIL

DT-TC-IE

OC

DT-TC-IE

NIL

PM-BS

OP

Specific development sub-objectives/milestones? The
overarching design/vision? Progress?
- We used paired programming: code is developed quickly
(although a little less quickly than with one programmer) and
it’s better code. The two programmers switch-off between
typing and reviewing where code is going from a higher level.
The two personalities have to have a common programming
style (often a problem). The two people use design patterns
to communication and share concepts of development.
- Paired programming + Brainstorming + Design + Knowledge
Exchange
- Design patterns= similar techniques are always used to do
certain things. Patterns characterized in terms of: when to
use, when not to use, trade-offs, which patterns work well
with others…not canned code…e.g., proxy, façade…
Team needs to work closely and with similar styles
Communication at the software level occurred during
implementation (via paired programming approach)
- Other communication took place at a white board. This was
used for working out and communicating higher level
constructs
Development milestones, etc. were established with
“functional people”, based on what the functional people
wanted and the “implementation people” could deliver.
- Milestones get ordered based on which products the
functional team has ready and a broader vision of the
functional specifications
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DT-OC-DP

DT-TC-BCG

SDTA-REQ
SDTA-D
DT-TC-MA

OP

OP

OP

Changes in requirements?design updates?
- Agile development says you don’t write to accommodate
future desires because it may be wasted effort (this person
doesn’t try to accommodate specific future desires, but does
try to build flexibility into the software and tries to build in
functions that would support a wide range of users and
circumstances).
- You write good code quickly and if the functional
specifications change, you re-write the code quickly.
How do you get the big picture early (big picture of the
development goals, etc…)?
- I don’t think there’s a good solution. It doesn’t go very well.
- Lots of meetings
- Some documentation. Documentation is difficult—it takes a
lot of effort but may not be what you want.

Interface: When will it work? When won’t it work? Software
people need to the software to be able to handle 100% of the
cases…functional requirements give a solution that addresses
70% of the cases (or less)…and the users get boxed in. To
handle this, go back and forth between the software
implementers and those developing functional requirements
to address the other 30%.

102

Appendix D: Calculation of Percent of Correspondence between Coders
The table presents five examples of high level codes assigned to data elements by
Coders A and B. The third and the fourth columns show the process adopted to determine the
correspondence.
Table 11
Process Used for the Calculation of Percent of Correspondence between Coders
Coder A codes
System
Development Team
–Organizational
Structure –
Customers, Users,
and Developers
System
Development
TeamOrganizational
Culture-Internal
Politics,
Competition, and
Conflicts
System
Development
TeamOrganizational
Culture-Internal
Politics,
Competition, and
Conflicts
System
Development
Project

Coder B codes

Match

Percent of
Correspondence
assigned

System
Development
TeamOrganizational
StructureDevelopment team
System
Development
TeamOrganizational
Culture-Internal
Politics,
Competition, and
Conflicts
System
Development
TeamOrganizational
StructureDevelopment team

1/1 (one match between
the high level code used;
DT)

2/3 (two matches between
three high level codes; DT,
PM, and SDTA)

System
Development
TeamOrganizational
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1

0.66

ManagementCustomer and User
Expectations
Management

Culture-Internal
Politics,
Competition, and
Conflicts

System
Development
Technical ActivitiesRequirements
Development,
Allocation, and
Management
System
Development
TeamOrganizational
Culture-Internal
Politics,
Competition, and
Conflicts

Project
ManagementCustomer and User
Expectations
Management

Project
ManagementCustomer and User
Expectations
Management
System
Development
TeamOrganizational
Culture-Internal
Politics,
Competition, and
Conflicts
Project
ManagementCustomer and User
Expectations
Management
System
Development

Project
ManagementCustomer and User
Expectations
Management

1/2 (only one match
between two high level
codes used; DT, PM)

0.5

1/3 (one match between
three high level codes; DT,
PM, and SDTA)

0.33

System
Development
TeamOrganizational
StructureDevelopment team
System
Development
TeamOrganizational
Culture-Internal
Politics,
Competition, and
Conflicts
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Technical ActivitiesRequirements
Development,
Allocation, and
Management
System
Development
TeamOrganizational
Culture-Internal
Politics,
Competition, and
Conflicts

External PressuresPolitics,
Competition, and
Conflicts external
to System
Development team

0/2 (No match between
high level codes; DT, EP)
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Appendix E: Taxonomy of Team Processes
Table 12
Taxonomy of Team Processes
Process Dimensions
Transition Processes

Definition

Mission Analysis
formulation and planning

Interpretation and evaluation of the team's mission, including
identification of its main tasks as well as the operative
environmental conditions and team resources available for
mission execution

Goal Specification

Identification and prioritization of goals and sub goals for
mission accomplishment

Strategy Formulation

Development of alternative courses of action for mission
accomplishment

Action Processes
Monitoring progress
toward goals

Tracking task and progress toward mission accomplishment,
interpreting system information in terms of what needs to be
accomplished for goal attainment, and transmitting progress to
team members

Systems Monitoring

Tracking team resources and environmental conditions as they
relate to mission accomplishment, which involves (1) internal
systems monitoring (tracking team resources such as
personnel, equipment, and other information that is generated
or contained within the team), and (2) environmental
monitoring (tracking the environmental conditions relevant to
the team)
Assisting team members to perform their tasks. Assistance may
occur by (1) providing a team verbal feedback or coaching, (2)
helping a teammate behaviorally in carrying out actions, or (3)
assuming and completing a task for a teammate

Team monitoring and
backup behavior

Coordination

Orchestrating the sequence and timing of interdependent
actions
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Interpersonal Processes
Conflict Management

Motivation and confidence
building

Affect Management

Preemptive conflict management involves establishing
conditioned to prevent, control, or guide team conflict before
it occurs. Reactive conflict management involves working
through task and interpersonal disagreements among team
members
Generating and preserving a sense of collective confidence,
motivation, and task-based cohesion with regard to mission
accomplishment
Regulating member emotions during mission accomplishment,
including (but not limited to) social cohesion, frustration, and
excitement

Note. Adapted from “A temporally based framework and taxonomy of team processes” by M. A. Marks, J.E.
Mathieu, and S. J. Zaccaro, 2001. Academy of Management Review, 26(3), 356-376, p. 363.
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Appendix D: Team Dimensional Training Prebrief
Table 13
Team Dimensional Training Prebrief
INFORMATION EXCHANGE
The first dimension is information exchange.
Effective information exchange allows the
team to develop and maintain shared
situation awareness.

COMMUNICATION
The second dimension is communication.
While information exchange deals with what
is passed to whom, this dimension involves
how that information is delivered.

The components of information exchange
are:
* Utilizing all available sources of
information
* Passing information to the appropriate
persons without having to be asked
* Providing periodic situation updates which
summarize the big picture

The components of communication delivery
are:
* Proper phraseology
* Completeness of standard reports
* Brevity/Avoiding excess chatter
* Clarity/Avoiding inaudible communications

SUPPORTING BEHAVIOR
The third dimension is supporting behavior.
This involves compensating for one another
in order to achieve team objectives.

INITIATIVE/LEADERSHIP
The fourth dimension is
initiative/leadership. Anyone on the team
can demonstrate initiative/leadership.

The components of supporting behavior are:
* Monitoring and correcting team errors
* Providing and requesting backup or
assistance to balance workload

The components of initiative/leadership are:
* Providing guidance or suggestions to team
members
* Stating clear and appropriate priorities

Note. Adapted from “Team dimensional training: A strategy for guided team self-correction. In J.A. CannonBowers and E. Salas (Eds.), Making Decisions under Stress: Implications for Individual and Team Training” by K.A.
Smith-Jentsch, R.L. Zeisig, B. Acton, and J.A. McPherson, 1998, 271-297, p. 276. Washington, DC: APA Press.
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Appendix G: Description of the final set of data-driven codes
Table 14
Final Set of Data-Driven Codes with Description
Final Codes
1)

Description

System Development Team

a) Organizational Culture

a. Internal Politics, Competition, and Conflicts

b. Attitudes about Management
c. Development philosophy/Acquisition strategy

b) Organizational Structure (including changes)
a. Multi-Company Development Team: Roles,
Responsibilities, and Relationships
b. Development Team: Roles, Responsibilities,
and Relationships
c. Customers, Users and Developers: Roles,
Responsibilities, and Relationships
d. Leadership: Roles, Responsibilities, and
Relationships
e. Team Member Characteristics
c) Team Coordination and Communication

a. Mission Analysis, Formulation, and Planning
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Deals with work place environment,
employee interactions, and the effects of
their actions on the environment.
Deals with politics, conflicts, competition
(for resources and credibility)
within the organization, and issues
arising as a consequence.
Attitudes developed about the higher
management
Philosophies and strategies advocated
and used for development and
acquisition processes.
Deals with line of authority; their roles,
responsibilities, and relationships; and
Information flow between them.
Roles, Responsibilities, and Relationships
Roles, Responsibilities, and Relationships
Roles, Responsibilities, and Relationships
Roles, Responsibilities, and Assignment
Capabilities of members and how they are
grouped into a team
Deals with team processes and how team
members communicate and resolve
various issues
Interpret and evaluate team’s purpose;
identify main tasks, detect and
respond to changes in operative
environment; assess available resources.

Identify and prioritize goals for mission
accomplishment
Cross-check or monitor teammates for
the purpose of assisting
proactively; provide/request assistance.
Coordinate task sequence and timing.

b. Goal Specification
c. Team Monitoring and Back-Up Behavior
d. Coordination

Preemptive- Prevent, control, or guide
situation to preempt possible
conflict; Reactive- Work through taskrelated and interpersonal
agreements among team members.
Advocate a specific source of action, team
priorities, and task
assignments.
Provide information for coordination
purposes.
Updating and Educating the team
members about every process to increase
awareness

e. Conflict Management

f. Initiative
g. Information Exchange
h. Build Common Ground and Awareness

2) System Development Project Management
(including management philosophy, attitudes,
and practices)
Planning the course of the project,
projected outcomes, materials and
resources needed, planning and being
prepared for changes.
Deals with policies and decisions
regarding contract agreements.
Estimation of the budget and schedule,
related errors and issues faced due to an
overshoot of budget and schedule.
Issues faced coping with the complexity
of the system and its infrastructure,
strategies adopted for optimization.
Deals with quality planning, control,
assurance and improvement methods
adopted and issues faced.
Documenting requirements and changes,
design and operational information
throughout a system lifecycle, to check

a) Planning / Re-planning

b) Contracting
c) Budget and Schedule

d) Complexity Management

e) Quality Management

a. Configuration Management
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b. Risk Management

f) Customer and User Expectations Management

g) Development Team Selection

h) Change Management

3)

for consistencies with its function,
attributes.
Identification, assessment, prioritization,
and strategies adopted to manage risks,
and employ resources effectively during
unexpected events.
Managing user expectation and issues
faced due to changing customer
expectations and demands.
Deals with the selection criteria and
issues considered while selecting the
development team
Managing changes at any part of the
system lifecycle and issues faced due to
changes

System Development Technical Activities

Method adopted to deal with
requirements, communication and
a) Requirements Development, Allocation, and
allocation of requirements, and managing
Management
changing requirements. Also problems
faced in these processes.
Deals with the development process
b) Design and Development (of architecture,
used, design criteria, strategy and
software, etc.)
methods adopted, and issues dealt with
during the process
Method of testing employed, issues
c) Testing/Evaluation
related with testing/evaluation.
Issues related with integration of system
d) Integration/Interfacing (of system components) components like hardware, software and
related processes.
Issues which arise when the product is
being delivered and deployed at the
e) Deployment (i.e., Integration with operational
operational environment. Includes issues
environment
of maintenance, integration with the
and users; includes maintenance)
operational environment, and ease of
usability by users.
Acquiring adequate knowledge about the
f) Acquire Domain Knowledge
project and the product and a thorough
understanding of the processes.
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4)

External Pressures

a) Politics, Competition, and Conflicts external
to System Development Team

b) Systems Engineering Industry Trends and
Practices (e.g., CMMI and Re-use)
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Pressures and issues faced due to
government Politics, dominance of a
superior company, competition from
smaller companies.
Pressures and issues arising due to
meeting with CMMI standards, present
market demands, new trends and
practices in systems engineering industry.

